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This thesis examines the spread of militant Islam in Kenya and Tanzania. We 
argue that Islamist militants who have gained a foothold in Kenya and are attempting to 
expand into Tanzania are behind an increasing number of attacks. We contend that 
spillover effects from the failed state of Somalia, along with influence from other external 
actors, are as important—if not more important—than other factors that receive the bulk 
of the attention, such as socioeconomic disparities and the perceived lack of political 
representation of Muslims. A third under-recognized but critical factor is the burgeoning 
population of Muslim youth. Ultimately, this thesis seeks to draw attention to the 
importance of these three factors. It concludes by offering options to counteract the 
spread of militant Islam in the region.       
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Even as we deal with crises and challenges in other parts of the world that 
often dominate our headlines, even as we acknowledge the real hardships 
that so many Africans face every day, we have to make sure that we’re 
seizing the extraordinary potential of today’s Africa, which is the youngest 
and fastest-growing of the continents. 
      – President Barack Obama 
 
At 5:30 a.m. on April 2, 2015, in Garissa, Kenya, Rashid Charles Mberesero, a 
Tanzanian national, and Abdirahim Mohamed Abdullahi, a Kenyan national, along with 
four other attackers assessed to be of Kenyan origin, departed their up-scale Garissa 
hotel. Armed with AK-47s, suicide vests, and grenades, they drove two pickup trucks to 
the Garissa University where Rashid, Abdirahim, and three other attackers were dropped 
off at the gate. They immediately killed two unarmed guards and made their way to the 
hostels filled with students. Their plan, to kill as many Christians as possible, had been 
months in the making and had just entered its final stages.  
Months earlier, the attackers had conducted a thorough casing of the university, 
reportedly even attending the university’s mosque to gain intimate knowledge of its 
layout and schedule.1 This reconnaissance completed, the scouts returned to Jubaland, 
Somalia, which shares a border with Kenya, and finalized their planning and conducted 
rehearsals.2 Not wanting to raise suspicion, the attackers then infiltrated back into Kenya 
using a well-traveled route through the Lag Badana Bushbush National Park, close to the 
                                                 




Dadaab refugee camp. Their aim was to blend in with the normal flow of refugees into 
Kenya.3 
At Garissa University, the attackers moved from hostel to hostel. The siege 
endured for over 15 hours before Kenyan security forces successfully subdued the 
attackers, killing five, including Abdirahim. Before it was all over, 144 students were 
killed and another 79 injured.4 Almost all of the victims were Christians. And, in keeping 
with the modus operandi of the al-Shabaab attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 
2013, the attackers reportedly specifically sought out Christians, separating them from 
Muslims by asking religious questions or requiring passages to be cited from the Koran.5 
The Christians were then systematically executed. Eight hours after the siege had 
reportedly ended, Rashid Charles Mberesero of Tanzania was finally captured, found 
hidden in the ceiling of a building and still holding onto explosives. His capture would be 
followed by the arrest of accessories who had supported the six attackers with logistics as 
they attempted to flee back to Somalia.  
Those writing about terrorism in East Africa today consistently point to Muslims’ 
lack of political representation and socioeconomic disparity as the main drivers of 
militant Islam. Although it is true that these factors can be found within many East 
African countries, current explanations fail to fully account for why militant Islam 
continues to grow in the region.6 After all, similar conditions are found across much of 
Africa.  
                                                 
3 Dadaab Refugee camp is a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) run refugee 
camp in Garissa County, Kenya for an approximate 350,000 Somali refugees and has been cited as a 
location for radicalization and recruitment for militant Islamists such as al-Shabaab. UNHCR,  
http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/region.php?id=3&country=110; and David Goldman, “How Al 
Shabaab Terrorists Exploit Dadaab Refugee Camp in Kenya,” Intelligence Briefs, June 5, 2015, 
http://www.intelligencebriefs.com/how-al-shabaab-terrorists-use-dadaab-refugee-camp-to-deploy-the-
banditry-strategy-a-policy-of-intimidation/. 
4 Edith Honan, “Kenya says government official’s son was among gunmen in Garissa attack,” Reuters, 
April 5, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/05/us-kenya-security-idUSKBN0MW03H20150405.  
5 Adow and Mathenge, “Attackers Slept in Garissa Hotel.” 
6 For this thesis we define the core countries of East Africa as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The East 
African Community includes these three countries as well as Rwanda and Burundi; however, we exclude 
them in this study.  
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Information that has been released about the Garissa attackers reveals that both 
Rashid and Abdirahim fail to fit the profile of being poor, undereducated, politically 
underrepresented Muslims. In Rashid’s case, his home country of Tanzania has remained 
neutral in the fight against al-Shabaab and is not participating in the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This, too, flies in the face of most explanations about 
the spread of militant Islam in East Africa. Further, both Rashid and Abdirahim were 
highly educated, with Rashid having completed technical school with a science 
background and Abdirahim earning a law degree. Abdirahim was also the son of a 
prominent Kenyan political official.7 In Kenya, reports have instead highlighted the 
importance of influence by external actors, especially in Abdirahim’s case. Even his 
fellow schoolmates noticed his radicalization. A recent article quotes one of Abdirahim’s 
fellow students as saying, “But it was in the moments after that lecture that they noticed 
trails of extremism in Abdirahim’s thinking. One student who engaged him afterwards 
said that he kept talking of death and waging jihad.”8 Abdirahim reportedly attempted to 
join the Islamic State, but failed to get to Syria and instead opted to join al-Shabaab with 
two of his high school friends.9  
A. WHY MILITANT ISLAM HAS SPREAD IN EAST AFRICA:  
A REVIEW OF CURRENT ANALYSIS 
Thus, far, contemporary explanations have failed to take into account the 
substantial role external actors have played in the current uptick in militant Islam in East 
Africa. Historic turmoil and instability in East Africa have served as catalysts for the 
creation of numerous extremist networks. More recently, external actors attempting to 
spread more radical forms of Islam, which has often become militant in nature, have 
exploited this instability. According to David Shinn, “The root causes are numerous and 
                                                 
7 “One of the al-Shabaab Attackers in Garissa University was a ‘Brilliant Upcoming Lawyer,” Shahan 
Journal, April 5, 2015, http://sahanjournal.com/one-al-shabaab-attackers-garissa-university-brilliant-
upcoming-lawyer/#.VdNskXbn-Ul; “Tanzania: Looking Behind Rashid Mberesero’s Background,” All 
Africa Global Media, April 11, 2015. http://allafrica.com/stories/201504131721.html. 
8 “One of the al-Shabaab Attackers.” 
9 Yassin Juma, “Revealed: Al-Shabaab man in Garissa Attack was a Lawyer and Son of Government 
Chief,” Kenya Today, April 5, 2015, http://www.kenya-today.com/opinion/revealed-alshabaab-man-in-
garissa-attack-was-a-lawyer-and-son-of-government-chief. 
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sometimes complex even within a single dispute. They include ethnic, language and 
cultural differences, arbitrary boundaries, religion, ideology, competition for scarce 
resources including pasturage and water, unequal sharing of resources controlled by the 
state, and the sheer desire for power.”10 Meanwhile, local factors affecting the spread of 
militant Islam are often overlooked or misinterpreted by outsiders. This confusion about 
causation leads to a misdiagnosis, whereby counteraction is taken to treat the symptoms, 
not the disease (to use a medical analogy).  
In addition, much of the literature credits socioeconomic factors for the spread of 
militant Islam in East Africa.11 However, disparate socioeconomic factors exist across the 
continent and have not culminated in terrorist activities everywhere. Culture has also 
been the focus of academic attention and is sometimes treated as though it transcends all 
other competing theories for why radicalization expands. Granted, culture affects all 
aspects of life. But, as Richard Downie and Jennifer Cooke note for ethnicity, “Ethnicity 
is perhaps the most important form of identity in sub-Saharan Africa… But ethnicity does 
not tend to be a cause of violence in itself. Instead, as the most common form of self-
identification, it is the one that is most commonly manipulated by unscrupulous 
operators.”12 In short, there is no doubt that extremist groups are intimately familiarly 
with these socioeconomic, cultural, and ethnic levers and understand how to manipulate 
them. But these factors by themselves fail to explain why militant Islam is spreading in 
East Africa. 
While some authors focus on socioeconomic disparity or cultural and ethnic 
differences, others pay attention to the nature of political representation. The perception 
is that the Muslims are politically underrepresented in both Kenya and Tanzania. For 
example, efforts by a Mombasa-based organization on behalf of regional autonomy 
                                                 
10 David Shinn, “Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview,” Journal of Conflict Studies 
23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 1.  
11 David M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight, “Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab and its Enemies in Eastern 
Africa,” African Affairs 114, no. 454 (December 19, 2014): 1–27; Angel Rabasa, Radical Islam in East 
Africa, RAND Corporation, 2009; Charles R. Stith, “Radical Islam in East Africa,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 632, no. 1 (2010): 55–66. 
12 Richard Downie and Jennifer G. Cooke, Assessing Risks to Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011), 11. 
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highlight local Muslims’ desire for more political representation along the Swahili 
coastline.13 Similarly, in Tanzania, the continued attempts by Zanzibar to attain 
autonomy suggest a degree of political alienation and the perception of 
underrepresentation by Muslims in government.14 This perception in Tanzania has 
historically applied mainly to Zanzibar. But as the mainland Muslim population grows, it 
appears increasing numbers of Muslims on the mainland also share this view.15 
Unfortunately, perception overstates reality, and there is relative parity between Christian 
and Muslim political representation within Tanzania.16  
Again, while instances of poor socioeconomic conditions, ethnic tensions, and 
political underrepresentation can be found in East Africa, they also exist elsewhere in 
Africa and throughout the developing world. Couple this with the fact that regional 
terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda in East Africa and al-Shabaab, have been substantially 
reduced in size, and we should wonder why militant Islam not only continues to spread, 
but is doing so at an increasing rate? Could there be other factors that contribute to the 
spread of militant Islam in East Africa that remain unaccounted for? Could these factors 
be at such an early stage of development that their effects are not yet obvious?  
B. INCREASINGLY RELEVANT FACTORS  
According to Charles Stith, Jeffrey Haynes, and Isaac Kfir, militant Islamic 
groups are actively seeking methods by which to spread militant Islam throughout the 
East African region.17 Three factors appear particularly significant in relation to the 
spread of militant Islam in Kenya and Tanzania. First, external actors are responsible for 
much of the spread of Wahhabi and Salafi ideology. Kfir notes that this is a recent 
                                                 
13 Kennedy Mkutu Agade, (Professor, United States International University-Africa), in discussion 
with the authors, September 10, 2015.  
14 Augustine Philip Mahiga, (Former Tanzanian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) and UN 
Special Representative to Somalia), in discussion with the authors, September 7, 2015. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Bruce E. Heilman and Paul J. Kaiser, “Religion, Identity and Politics in Tanzania,” Third World 
Quarterly 23, no. 4 (August 2002); 691–709. 
17 Jeffrey Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 8 (2005): 1321–
1339.; Isaac Kfir, “Islamic Radicalism in East Africa: Is there a Cause for Concern?” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 31, no. 9 (2008): 829–855; and Stith, “Radical Islam in East Africa.”  
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development—within the last 30 years—in a region that has long-standing historical ties 
to the Arab world.18 These historical ties, based on trade, culture, and religion, have been 
used to new effect by Islamists, jihadists, and others coming from places like Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Somalia, Iran, and Sudan. In addition to state sponsors, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and Islamic charities have also supported the spread of radical 
ideology and militant Islam.  
The second factor contributing to the spread of militant Islam is a growing youth 
bulge. Studies about the impact of youth bulge on violence have typically centered on the 
Middle East and North Africa; this is predominantly due to the events of the Arab 
Spring.19 However, over the last few years, several reports, to include the most recent 
U.S. National Military Strategy, have sought to focus more attention on the susceptibility 
of pools of youth, to include those found in East Africa.20 Unfortunately, most of the 
youth bulge data is general, and not specific to Muslim populations in Kenya and 
Tanzania.  
Third, we need to consider the continued negative impact of the failed state of 
Somalia on the security of Kenya and Tanzania. The spillage of ideology and the flow of 
fighters and resources between al-Shabaab and associated Muslim organizations in Kenya 
and Tanzania have acted as a catalyst to the growth of militant Islam beyond just 
Somalia.  
Ultimately, socioeconomic disparity, culture and ethnic issues, and political 
underrepresentation all contribute the spread of militant Islam, but little evidence 
suggests they are the cause alone. Instead, the spillover effects from Somalia coupled 
with the convergence of external actors and a Muslim youth bulge in Kenya and Tanzania 
more accurately account for the growth of militant Islam in both countries.  
                                                 
18 Kfir, “Islamic Radicalism in East Africa: Is There a Cause for Concern?” 831–832. 
19 Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” International 
Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2006): 607–629. 
20 Martin Dempsey, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, 2015), 7.  
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C. APPROACH 
This thesis utilizes a comparative case study approach. This method was selected 
in order to focus heavily on detailed, actor-specific evidence to facilitate qualitative 
analysis. We pay attention to factors such as socioeconomic and political 
underrepresentation. Our hypothesis is that a combination of external actors, Somalia 
spillage, and a Muslim youth bulge in East Africa are exacerbating the conditions already 
identified in the literature with regards to the growth of militant Islam.  
Overall, it is apparent that local nuances and unique circumstances play an 
important role in the spread of militant Islam and cannot be underestimated or assumed 
away in the quest to explain its spread. This fact came to the forefront during our 
research, specifically when we traveled in the region and interviewed experts there. 
Taking local wrinkles into account greatly adds to the complexity of the issue and 
underscores a major theme in this thesis: it is impossible to isolate a single or even a few 
variables to accurately account for the causal linkages behind the spread of militant Islam 
in East Africa.  
Our examination of the relevant literature has been augmented by travel and 
interviews with regional and local experts in both Kenya and Tanzania. We have drawn 
on accounts published by the Open Source Center, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 
National Defense University, RAND Corporation, National Counterterrorism Center, 
Pew Research Center, University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database, Combating 
Terrorism Center Sentinel at West Point, Institute for Security Studies, The Economist 
and Economist Intelligence Unit, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Foreign 
Service Journal, Congressional Research Service, United States Agency for International 
 8
Development, and various United Nations Organizations.21 Finally, we have also drawn 
on personal experience and our first-hand familiarity with the region.  
Kenya and Tanzania were chosen because both locations share a set of conditions 
but, conversely, also exhibit interesting differences. Similarities include demographics, 
socioeconomic conditions, culture (to include religion), a growing Muslim population, 
and high levels of influence from a diverse set of external actors. As for differences, these 
include the nature and arrangement of domestic politics, each country’s historical ties to 
the Arabian Peninsula, varying national policies regarding counterterrorism strategy, and 
geographic proximity (or not) to Somalia.  
We begin in Kenya with a select set of terrorist incidents that have been chosen to 
highlight spillover effects from a failed Somalia, the importance of external actors, and 
the convergence of these two factors with a growing Muslim youth bulge. We provide a 
brief overview of each attack and background significant to the event. We then provided 
a brief analysis for each attack. We follow the same template in the Tanzania case study. 
We then move to a case comparison in Chapter IV. Finally, our conclusion summarizes 
the findings of this thesis and provides recommendations for addressing the factors we 
examine.  
  
                                                 
21 As a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, the University of Maryland manages 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) project and Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD). The GTD is an open-source database, which include information on terrorist events around the 
world from 1970 through 2014. Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on 
domestic as well as transnational and international terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time 
period, and now includes more than 140,000 cases. For each GTD incident, information is available on the 
date and location of the incident, the weapons used, the nature of the target, the number of casualties, and—
when identifiable—the group or individual responsible. Statistical information contained in the Global 
Terrorism Database is based on reports from a variety of open media sources. Information is not added to 




David Shinn writes, “There are three kinds of terrorism in East Africa… These 
are acts perpetrated by organizations based outside the region, those by an organization 
within the region but aimed at a neighboring country, and those instigated by an internal 
insurgent group against authority in a single country.”22 Currently, Kenya is facing all 
three types of terrorism. What follows is a review of four events involving militant Islam 
in Kenya with a focus on the impact by external actors and by a Muslim youth bulge 
within the context of each case.23 The first event is the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing 
which highlights the first real penetration of Kenya by a militant Islamist group: al-
Qaeda. The second event centers on the Westgate Mall attack. It highlights a diverse set 
of external factors affecting militant Islam in Kenya including AMISOM, al-Shabaab, 
and U.S. policies. The third event takes us back to the Garissa University attack presented 
in the thesis’s introduction. Finally, we consider the role of the Mombasa Republic 
Council to highlight how domestic policies have affected the growth of militant Islam in 
Kenya. Our aim in each instance is to draw attention to how external actors exploit 
conditions among an ever-growing Muslim population.  
1. August 7, 1998: U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya 
a. Event 
The 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi is often cited as the first attack 
in Kenya by an externally based, modern-era Islamic terrorist group. On the morning of 
August 7, 1998, a Nissan Atlas truck carrying two Saudi members of al-Qaeda in East 
Africa, Mohammed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali and Jihad Mohammed Ali, drove into the 
U.S. Embassy parking lot in downtown Nairobi. The truck was packed with a vehicle-
                                                 
22 Shinn, “Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview,” 1. 
23 See Appendix C for full details on age distribution in Kenya and Appendix B for Pew research 
projection of Muslim population growth in Kenya. 
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borne explosive device that was detonated by the driver, Ali.24 Upon initiation of the 
trigger, an enormous explosion shattered much of the U.S. Embassy and collapsed a 
neighboring building (see Figure 1). Overall, the bombings in Kenya claimed more than 
213 lives and injured an estimated 4,000 people.25 
Figure 1.  1998 U.S. Embassy Bombing, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Source: “Nairobi Bombing Map,” Washington Post, 1998, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/maps/nairobimap
.htm. 
Responsibility for this attack and a nearly simultaneous bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania was immediately claimed by al-Qaeda in East 
Africa. The Nairobi attack was planned and executed by more than seventeen terrorists 
from throughout East Africa and the Middle East. Accessories hailed from countries such 
as Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tanzania. This bombing was complex in 
nature, and consisted of in-depth planning efforts originating in Nairobi. The Nairobi cell 
coordinated with other terrorist cells in Tanzania in order to synchronize their efforts. Al-
Qaeda had been operating in Kenya for quite some time, with some reports indicating it 
                                                 
24 Adam Robinson, Bin Laden: The Inside Story of the Rise and Fall of the Most Notorious (New 
York, NY: Arcade Publishing, 2011), 230.  
25 Richard H. Schultz and Ruth M. Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al-Qai’Da’s 
Operations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 8, no. 2 (2004): 62.  
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was active as early as 1993.26 Additionally, the Embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania 
were specifically planned to be executed on the eighth anniversary of the U.S. military’s 
arrival in Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Storm.27 
b. Background 
Al-Qaeda’s original interest in Kenya was to establish safe houses while using the 
country as a “jumping-off point” for terrorist activities in the region.28 The U.S. Embassy 
in Nairobi then became a target. Central to the selection of the U.S. Embassy was the 
desire by Osama Bin Laden to attack Western countries, specifically the United States, as 
part of his greater jihad. Bin Laden considered the United States an adversary based on its 
military intervention in the Middle East and Somalia.  
In 1991, the United States’ central role in Operation Desert Storm placed it 
squarely in al-Qaeda’s crosshairs. This event and the resulting occupation of Muslim 
lands by American forces have provided a rallying cry for Islamist terrorists to this day.29 
In 1992, Bin Laden relocated to Sudan following his exile from Saudi Arabia for his 
dissension from the Saudi government. Bin Laden’s presence in Sudan was critical to the 
rise of al-Qaeda’s presence in Africa and underscored the importance of the region to the 
greater-global jihad from the earliest years of the organization’s existence. It was during 
this time in Sudan that Bin Laden was able to partner Al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA) 
with existing radical Islamist militants in the region. This specifically included the 
Somalia-based groups, al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) and later the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU) and its militant wing, al-Shabaab. 
                                                 
26 Marc Lacey and Benjamin Weiser, “After Blast, Kenya Reviews Qaeda’s Trail in East Africa,” New 
York Times, December 1, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/01/international/africa/01KENY.html. 
27 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2002), 46. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Bernard Lewis, “License to Kill: Usama Bin Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad,” Foreign Affairs 
(November/December 1998); Hedrick Smith, “Inside the Terror Network: Al Qaeda—Background,” Public 
Broadcasting Service, 2002.  
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Also in 1992, the United States deployed military forces to Somalia in support of 
the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM).30 This Western intervention 
further cemented Bin Laden’s hatred of the United States, and ultimately led to his 
decision to send al-Qaeda trainers to Somalia to strengthen local militias opposed to these 
external forces.31 It was during the infamous Battle of Mogadishu, better known as 
Blackhawk Down, that al-Qaeda personnel are said to have engaged in direct combat 
against United States military forces for the first time.32 This event, and the resulting 
death of 18 elite U.S. Soldiers, solidified AQEA’s presence in Somalia.  
AQEA continued to thrive in Somalia and soon expanded its operations into 
Kenya, where it found favorable conditions. Following the 1998 Embassy bombing, more 
than 350 additional terrorist attacks were executed in Kenya, with the preponderance of 
them being attributed to terrorism perpetrated by Islamic militants.33 Even though select 
Kenyan Muslims played a supporting role in the 1998 Embassy bombing, this was clearly 
a terrorist attack sponsored by an external actor. Al-Qaeda was able to use this event as 
propaganda to attract attention to its cause, laying the foundation for future terrorist 
events. 
The 1998 Embassy bombing does raise the question of how such a significant 
number of al-Qaeda personnel established a foothold in Kenya. During its post-attack 
inquiry, the United States’ Federal Bureau of Investigation found that many of the 
                                                 
30 In November 1992, the United States offered to support UNOSOM in its delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. The United Nations Security Council accepted the offer and developed the Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF), which was made up of 37,000 forces from 24 countries. This task force was authorized the use 
of “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for the relief effort. In March of 1993, the 
United Nations Security Council transitioned UNITAF operations to a new peacekeeping operation, 
UNOSOM II. For more details see: “Somalia – UNOSOM I: Background,” United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsom1backgr1.html. 
31 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Ladin, from the Soviet 
Invasion Until September 10, 2001 (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2004).  
32 Smith, “Inside the Terror Network: Al Qaeda—Background.”    
33 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2015). 
Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.  
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members had arrived in Kenya under the pretense of working for Kenya-based NGOs.34 
In actuality, these organizations were created by al-Qaeda and were only a front for 
smuggling in resources to be used to execute terrorism.  
The importance of NGOs that has contributed to the spread of militant Islam is yet 
another external factor in Kenya and East Africa writ large. Multiple examples exist of 
NGOs being used as conduits to influence the environment in Kenya. For instance, the 
Saudi Arabian government used this method of deploying NGOs to introduce a stricter, 
more Wahhabist, interpretation of Islam.35 David McCormack found that Saudi Arabia’s 
methods include “the funding of mosques, Islamic centers and madrassas; the facilitation 
of travel to the Kingdom for purposes of the hajj and educational exchanges; the 
contribution of humanitarian aid and other charitable work; and the provision of support 
for “indigenous” Wahhabi organizations.”36 Two such organizations are the Muslim 
World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, which, according to the Pew 
Research Center, “remain rooted in a very particular religious worldview—Saudi 
Wahhabism.”37 These are only two of a number of intentionally camouflaged 
organizations operating in Kenya.  
Al-Qaeda’s decision to use Kenya as a location from which to launch a terrorist 
attack was not random. Kenya was picked for explicit reasons; one of the more important 
is its proximity to Somalia. Jeffrey Haynes points to Somalia as the entry point for 
militant Islam in East Africa.38 The collapse of Somalia in the early 1990s created a 
                                                 
34 “The Trail of Evidence: FBI Executive Summary,” Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), November 
18, 1998, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html. This is a 
declassified executive summary of the findings of the FBI investigation into the embassy bombings as of 
November 18, 1998. The report was distributed to law enforcement agencies in Kenya, Tanzania, and other 
countries to assist in their investigations and includes identifying information about the suspects. The full 
report remains classified. 
35 William R. Patterson, “Islamic Radicalization in Kenya,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 78 (Third 
Quarter, 2015): 16–23. 
36 David McCormack, An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: The 
Center for Security Policy, January 2005). 
37 Pew Research Center, “Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe: Muslim World 
League and World Assembly of Muslim Youth,” September 15, 2010, http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/
15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-muslim-world-league-and-world-assembly-of-
muslim-youth/. 
38 Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa,” 1322. 
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lawless safe haven for terrorist actors who were then able to use the country for 
recruitment, training, and planning of terrorist activities. Extremists then exported their 
radical ideology into Kenya through a porous border inhabited by ethnic Somalis and 
other practicing Muslims. Existing social, religious, and clan ties coupled with poverty, 
unemployment, and rapid population growth allowed the militant ideology developed in 
Somalia to quickly expand south into Kenya.39 Not surprisingly, Samuel Huntington 
identifies the area from Somalia southward along the Swahili Coast as a potential fault 
line for violence (see Figure 2). According to Huntington, “Adjacent groups along the 
fault lines between civilization struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and 
each other … and [to] competitively promote their particular political and religious 
values.”40 We would content that this is precisely what allowed AQEA to gain access to 
the East Africa region. This fault line remains active today, especially as violence spills 
over from Somalia, and trickles down the Swahili coastline, and taking root in Kenya.
                                                 
39 Fredrick Nzes, “Terrorist Attacks in Kenya Reveal Domestic Radicalization,” Combating Terrorism 
Center Sentinel 5, no. 10 (October 29, 2012): 14.  
40 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993): 29. 
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Figure 2.  The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
 
Source: Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”  
Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993). 
c. Analysis 
One key insight to glean from the Embassy bombing is al-Qaeda’s growing 
interest in Kenya. It is important to recognize that Osama Bin Laden’s resentment of 
Western powers can be traced back to the events in the Middle East in 1991. However, 
the collapse of Somalia provided al-Qaeda the opportunity to establish a foothold in an 
ungoverned area. Somalia also provided the opportunity for al-Qaeda to actively attack 
Western military forces during UNOSOM. This foothold and resulting expansion from 
Somalia down the Swahili coast into Kenya should have been anticipated. Another factor 
noticeable in the 1998 bombings is the increase in external Islamist actors. These actors 
were able to take advantage of existing social, political, and religious divides.  
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2. September 21, 2013: Westgate Mall, Nairobi, Kenya 
a. Event 
In 2013, al-Shabaab executed its most calamitous attack outside of Somalia when 
it assaulted a major shopping center in Nairobi. The attack was launched by at least four 
Muslim youths originating from Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia. The assailants began by 
throwing hand grenades into a crowded outdoor food court and then assaulting the 
parking deck and interior shopping areas with automatic rifles. Upon entering the 
expansive mall, the militants systematically worked their way back into a crowded 
grocery store where many shoppers had fled upon hearing the initial gunfire. 
Approximately ninety-six hours later, the siege ended as the Kenyan military and police 
forces finally cleared the charred remains of the building (see Figure 3). The attack killed 
close to seventy patrons and attracted global attention. The media coverage was exactly 
what al-Shabaab was seeking in order to bring increased awareness to their opposition to 
Kenyan troops in Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 
The perpetrators of the attack were all members of al-Shabaab.   
 17
Figure 3.  Westgate Mall Attack Diagram 
 
 




Al-Shabaab, translated as “The Youth” in Arabic, has existed since at least 2007. 
This specific use of the Arabic language was adopted by its founders to directly appeal to 
young Muslim Somalis who were tired of traditional clan-based politics and clan warfare. 
The origins of al-Shabaab can be traced back to a more politically focused movement, the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which formed in 2000 in an attempt to bring order to 
Somalia following the collapse of the government in 1991 and the ensuing civil war 
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during the mid-1990s. The ICU offered clan-based governance under Sharia.41 In 2006, it 
proved able to wrest control of Mogadishu away from local warlords who were backed 
by the United States.42 Following a U.S.-supported invasion by Ethiopian military forces 
in December 2006, the ICU surrendered control of Mogadishu to the Somalia 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Following this surrender, the ICU’s militant 
wing, al-Shabaab, splintered off to continue fighting Ethiopian forces.  
In 2008, al-Shabaab successfully expelled the Ethiopian forces from Somalia, 
bringing much credit to its cause.43 However, since 2008, al-Shabaab’s conventional 
military capabilities have been severely degraded thanks to a surge in military operations 
carried out by members of AMISOM. Even so, in 2010, the U.S. Department of State 
warned that, “Al Shabaab poses serious terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. 
interests in the region,” and that, “Evidence of linkages between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional 
dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area.”44  In 2012, this linkage 
was formalized when al-Shabaab formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. The 
announcement of this relationship instantly increased al-Shabaab’s status and legitimacy 
as a terrorist organization. Since the union, al-Shabaab’s objectives have expanded from 
Somalia, and recent activities highlight its regional reach.  
Currently, AMISOM is combating al-Shabaab inside Somalia. AMISOM is a 
regional force consisting of military forces from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Sierra Leone, and Uganda.45 Small contingents of Western military forces are advising 
both AMISOM and Somalia’s security forces. Continued pressure from AMISOM forces 
                                                 
41 Stanford University, “Islamic Courts Union,” Mapping Militant Organizations, July 18, 2012, 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/107.  
42 Rabasa, Radical Islam in East Africa, 8.  
43 David Shinn, “Al Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Spring 
2011, http://www.fpri.org/articles/2012/08/al-shabaabs-foreign-threat-somaliaqz.  
44 Lauren Ploch, Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response (CRS Report No. R41473) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), i.  
45 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission 
operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. For more information regarding 
AMISOM military forces see: “African Union Mission in Somalia Military Component,” http://amisom-
au.org/mission-profile/military-component/.  
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have pushed al-Shabaab out of urban areas and into the Somali countryside. The loss of 
urban strongholds, such as Baraawe and Kismayo in southern Somalia, has eliminated al-
Shabaab’s ability to carry out large-scale military offensives. As such, it has reverted to 
guerilla-style hit-and-run tactics as its modus operandi. Additionally, this has forced al-
Shabaab to look elsewhere to conduct terrorist operations. As early as 2007, but 
particularly since 2011, Kenya has felt the brunt of al-Shabaab’s new tactics. This can be 
seen not only in the increased number of attacks within Coast and North East Provinces, 
but in attacks against Kenyan military forces deployed to Jubaland in southern Somalia as 
well (See Figure 4).46 
Figure 4.  Al-Shabaab Terrorist Attacks, 2012–2014  
 
Source: Amy Pate, Michael Jensen and Erin Miller, Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa 
University in Kenya (University of Maryland, Maryland: The National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], April 2015). 
                                                 
46 The National Counterterrorism Center, “Al-Shabaab,” November 16, 2015, http://www.nctc.gov/
site/groups/al_shabaab.html. 
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Drilling further down into Kenya, it can be seen that there was a sharp increase in 
attacks following the 2011 intervention of Kenyan military forces in Somalia (See Figure 
5). The majority of these terrorist incidents can be linked to militant Islamic movements, 
most often al-Shabaab.47 The effects of these attacks have been felt across the country at 
both local and state levels. Additionally, there have been regional and international 
impacts from these militant attacks. Events such as the 2002 attacks in Mombasa* and 
the siege of the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013 have specifically targeted either 
Westerners or Western-owned businesses and have had a profoundly detrimental impact 
on the tourism industry in Kenya.48 This was evident during our recent travel to Kenya, 
where the local security posture has been greatly increased at all major tourist locations. 
This is visible in more armed security forces, additional checkpoints, and roving security 
patrols.  
                                                 
47 According to the Global Terrorism Database, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have all had significant 
increases in terrorist attacks that are directly attributed to militant Islam. These attacks numbers by 
perpetrator reveal the vast majority having been conducted by al-Shabaab. National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. 
Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.  
*The 2002 attack in Mombasa was synchronized at multiple locations and claimed the lives of 13 
people, while wounding 80. The initial attack was launched at the Kikambala Hotel where the terrorist 
group used small arms, grenades, and a car bomb to attack Israeli tourists who had just checked into the 
hotel. Almost simultaneously, two SA-7 shoulder fired rockets were fired at a departing Boeing 757 airliner 
as it took off from Moi International Airport.  
48 Both Tanzania and Kenya have seen a notable decline in tourism revenue due to terrorist activities. 
Elayne Wangalwa, “Kenyan Tourism Faces Negative Impact Due to Domestic Terrorism,” CNBC Africa, 
February 12 2015, http://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/east-africa/2014/05/27/kenyan-tourism-faces-negative-
impact-due-to-domestic-terrorism; Robert Spencer, “Zanzibar: Muslims Bomb Cathedral and Tourist Bar,” 
Jihad Watch, February 24, 2014, http://www.jihadwatch.org/2014/02/zanzibar-muslims-bomb-cathedral-
and-tourist-bar. 
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Figure 5.  Number of terror attacks in Kenya, 1998–2014 
 
Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. 
Inside Kenya, al-Shabaab has joined with an Eastleigh organization called the 
Muslim Youth Center (MYC). In 2008, the MYC was founded in the Pumwani Riyadha 
Mosque in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh. Eastleigh, sometimes known as “Little 
Mogadishu,” is a part of town that has been predominantly ethnic Somali for decades. 
The MYC provided Kenyan Muslims with the opportunity to informally engage with 
local religious leaders to discuss social and economic grievances.49 However, overtime, 
the organization adopted a more radical ideology as it increased its support of al-Shabaab. 
West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center determined that as early as 2009, the MYC 
provided al-Shabaab “with a large potential pool of recruits.”50 In 2012, the more radical 
elements of the MYC changed their name to al-Hijra and reportedly became the Kenyan 
wing of al-Shabaab. According to the United Nations Monitoring Group, al-Hijra 
                                                 
49 Christopher Anzalone, “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabaab’s East African 
Recruitment,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 5, no. 10 (October 2012): 10. 
50 Ibid. 
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continues to support al-Shabaab through recruitment and fund raising. It is apparently 
also actively seeking to expand its presence in Kenya, specifically along the Swahili 
coastline.51 As mentioned previously, local mosques are being used to spread al-Hijra’s 
radical version of Islam. Many of these mosques are established and/or funded by 
external NGOs or others with interests in the region.52 
The ability for MYC and al-Hijra to recruit is enhanced by bringing in guest 
speakers from al-Shabaab as well as religious leaders who have local credibility.53 One 
well-known cleric is Sheikh Aboud Rogo, who supported the MYC, from the Masjid 
Musa Mosque in Mombasa until his 2012 assassination by the Kenyan police.54 Sheik 
Rogo had clear ties to al-Shabaab and was reported to have spent time in Somalia as a 
guest of the terrorist organization. Following his death, the MYC issued a statement that 
Sheik Rogo should be considered, “a shining example of a true and pious Muslim, 
unwavering and steadfast in his determination to fight injustices against Muslims all over 
the world.”55  
In the eyes of some, Kenya’s invasion of Somalia represents one such injustice. In 
2007, the Transitional Federal Government, now the Somali Federal Government, and 
AMISOM forged a status of mission agreement. Initially, AMISOM was constrained to 
operating only in Mogadishu. However, following Kenya’s invasion of Somalia in 2011, 
AMISOM was able to expand its area of operations well beyond the capital city. 
Following Kenya’s official joining of AMISOM in 2012, Kenyan forces successfully 
expelled al-Shabaab from the southern port town of Kismayo. This city was of 
considerable importance to al-Shabaab, which used the port to export illegal charcoal, 
which, in turn, generated a substantial profit.  
                                                 
51 United Nations, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 2060,” 2013. 
52 Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa.”   
53 Nzes, “Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab’s Affiliate In Kenya.” 
54 Sunguta West, “Islamist Radicalization: A New Challenge for Kenya,” Militant Leadership 
Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Quarterly Special Report (April, 2015): 17. 
55 Anzalone, “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabaab’s East African Recruitment.” 
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Once in control of Kismayo, Kenya began collecting taxes at the Port of Kismayo 
and checkpoints around the city.56 The Kenyan government has also been quite overt 
about its desire for a Jubaland buffer state and the relocation of Somali refugee camps in 
North Eastern Province back into Somalia.57 Local Somalis have begun to view the 
Kenyan military forces as occupiers.58 Al-Shabaab then uses this to attract support for 
attacks against Kenyan forces in Somalia, as well as to legitimize terrorist attacks within 
Kenya proper, such as the Westgate and Garissa attacks. 
c. Analysis 
Al-Shabaab did not achieve its current level of prevalence in Kenya overnight; the 
organization adapted to the existing environment in order to ensure its relevance and 
permanence. Worth noting is that al-Shabaab has transitioned from engaging in 
conventional battles with Ethiopia, Kenya, and AMISOM forces in Somalia to more 
asymmetrical and devastating terrorist attacks, many focused inside Kenya. Kenya, like 
the other troop-contributing countries to AMISOM, is viewed as an outside entity with 
self-serving interests in Somalia.59 The involvement of the Kenyan government in 
internal Somalia politics has not gone unremarked by al-Shabaab, and numerous al-
Shabaab spokesmen have cited Kenya’s military occupation as the reason for the 
Westgate Mall attack.  
3. April 2, 2015: Garissa University College, Garissa, Kenya 
a. Event 
In April 2015, at least four members of al-Shabaab assaulted a local college in the 
northeastern city of Garissa. Three of the attackers were identified as Somali-Kenyans 
and one was Tanzanian-born. The attack started in the early morning as students were 
preparing for morning prayer. The assailants went from dormitory to dormitory (see 
                                                 
56 Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa.”  
57 Ibid. 
58 International Crisis Group, “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia,” February 15, 2012, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/184-the-kenyan-military-intervention-in-
somalia.aspx.  
59 Ibid.  
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Figure 6) seeking Christian students, who were subsequently executed. The perpetrators 
initially took over 700 people captive, finally killing 147 people identified as 
Christians.60 This horrific attack and the resulting number of casualties make it the most 
deadly attack in Kenya since the 1998 Embassy bombing. 
Figure 6.  Garissa University College Attack Diagram 
 
Source: “Kenya Attack: 147 Dead in Garissa University Assault,” BBC News, 
April 3, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080. 
The separation of Muslims from non-Muslims is an interesting development since 
most terrorist attacks are indiscriminant. Of particular note is that in the Westgate and 
Garissa attacks, it was reported that the militants asked that all Muslims present 
                                                 
60 “Kenya Attack: 147 Dead in Garissa University Assault,” BBC News, April 3, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080. 
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themselves.61 These individuals were either let go outright or quizzed about Islamic 
knowledge before being set free. Attention to religion in the midst of the attack sheds 
light on its purpose and focus.  
b. Background 
The Garissa attack highlights and exacerbates the growing tension and increased 
social hostilities among Kenyans. As seen in other places with diverse religious beliefs, 
Kenya has always experienced some level of hostility based on the practice of various 
religions. However, the Westgate and Garissa attacks are on a much larger scale than 
anything seen previously. According to a Pew Research report,  
The number of people killed in religion-related terrorist attacks in Kenya 
has dramatically increased in recent years. According to reports analyzed 
by the Pew Research Center as part of our ongoing global study of 
religious restrictions and hostilities, more than 300 people were killed, 
injured or displaced as a result of religion-related terrorist attacks in 
Kenya in 2012, more than twice as many as in 2011 and more than a five-
fold increase from 2010.62 
Pew defines social hostilities as “concrete acts of religious violence ranging from 
hate crimes to religion-related terrorism and war,” but also includes sectarian and mob 
violence where the killings are motivated by religion.63 As shown in Figure 7, Kenya is 
currently seeing almost four times the level of social hostility as is found in the rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa (a total of 48 other countries). This disparity has led more than half 
of the Kenyan population to view Islamic extremism as a major threat to the country.64 
Another, more nuanced indicator that religiously-based violence is increasing is that 
                                                 
61 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “From Westgate to Garissa, Al-Shabab’s Murderous 
Wave,” Foreign Policy, April 10, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/10/al-shabab-garissa-attack-
westgate-kenya/. 
62 Brian J. Grim, “Nairobi’s Westgate Mall Terrorist Attack is Part of Kenya’s Sharp Rise in Religious 





some non-Muslims in Kenya are learning the basics of Islam as a method of protection, 
should they find themselves caught in an event such as Westgate or Garissa.65  
Figure 7.  Rate of Social Hostilities High in Kenya 
 
Source: Grim, Brian J. “Nairobi’s Westgate Mall Terrorist Attack is Part of Kenya’s 
Sharp Rise in Religious Hostilities,” Pew Research Center, September 24, 2013, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/24/nairobi-mall-terrorist-attack-is-part-of-
kenyas-sharp-rise-in-religious-hostilities/. 
The North Eastern Province has experienced the greatest number of terrorist-
based attacks, the most significant of which was the Garissa University College incident 
(See Figure 8). However, instability in this Province can be traced back to Kenya’s 
                                                 
65 John Hayward, “Al-Shabaab Threatens Ramadan Attack; Terrified Christians Convert to Islam,” 
Breitbart, June 15, 2015, http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/06/15/al-shabaab-threatens-
ramadan-attack-terrified-christians-convert-to-islam/.  
 27
independence in 1963 and to efforts by ethnic Somalis living in the Northern Frontier 
District to rejoin greater Somalia. The unsuccessful secessionist movement became 
known as the Shifta War and lasted from 1963 to 1968. This conflict was quite complex 
in nature and pulled on the strings of existing social and economic ties in both Kenya and 
Somalia. Decision made in Nairobi to shoot presumed Shifta rebels on sight and to 
confiscate all Somali-owned cattle exacerbated the situation between Kenya’s ethnic 
Somalis and the government.66 The Shifta War also forced the relocation of ethnic 
Somalis into government owned camps, known as mantayyas.67 The government’s 
reactions to unrest in North Eastern Province reverberate today.  
Figure 8.  Terror attacks in Kenya, by province, 1998–2014 
 
Adapted from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Africa Data 
Version 5 [Data file] http://www.acleddata.com/data/version-5-data-1997-2014/. 
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67 Ibid., 112. 
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Adding to the chronically tense relations in North Eastern Province are the 
existence of the world’s largest refugee camps located in Dadaab, just outside of the city 
of Garissa. These refugee camps have existed for close to 20 years and are managed by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The camps house approximately 
350,000 people, effectively making this location one of Kenya’s largest cities. The camps 
were established following the collapse of the Somali government in the early 1990s, and 
have come to serve as permanent residences for the Somalis who are unable, or 
unwilling, to return to Somalia. Refugee camps along the Somali border, such as those in 
Dadaab, present a security concern because of the potential to introduce external 
elements into Kenya. Groups, such as al-Shabaab, have been known to cross over the 
porous Somali border and enter the camps to recruit and collect support.68  
As Human Rights Watch has found, extremist recruitment often relies on: 
Deceptive practices, promising exorbitant pay and claiming that the force 
has United Nations and other international backing. They have urged 
teenage refugees to lie about their ages and to join without informing their 
families. Former recruits say that their cell phones were taken from them 
before they were transported to the training center.69  
Moreover, in places such as Dadaab, young people are faced with very few options for 
their future. The World Bank found that North Eastern Province has the highest level of 
unemployment in Kenya, with approximately 55% of youth (15-29) unable to find 
work.70 Based on the population in the camps at Dadaab, this equates to over 15,000 
unemployed youth in the 15 to 29-year-old age range. This lack of opportunity along with 
deceptive recruitment practices used by terrorist organization has the potential to push 
young people to join al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, as security continues to improve in 
Somalia, some refugees are returning home. In 2014, Kenya successfully established a 
                                                 
68 Goldman, “How Al Shabaab Terrorists Exploit Dadaab Refugee Camp in Kenya.” 
69 Human Rights Watch, “Kenya: Stop Recruitment of Somalis in Refugee Camps,” October 22, 2009, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/22/kenya-stop-recruitment-somalis-refugee-camps. 
70 Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment, 
Volume 1: Synthesis Report (Washington, D.C.:  World Bank Publications, Jan 1, 2008 ), xvii. 
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pilot program to aid in the relocation of Dadaab residents back to their home cities in 
Somalia. As of August 2015, 2,969 Somali refugees have been repatriated.71 
Similar to overcrowding found at refugee camps, urban areas are also of particular 
concern. As seen with Dadaab, if densely populated areas are not properly monitored, 
they offer extremist organizations a large pool of marginalized young people to radicalize 
and influence. The Economist determined that “Half of all Africans are under 20, and are 
rapidly moving to cities: more than 40% of Africans now live in urban areas.”72 This 
movement from historically rural, tribally based communities poses numerous 
challenges. Nairobi faces the greatest increase in urbanization, but other cities are rapidly 
growing as well.73 Smaller regions lack the required resources to support rapid growth in 
population. Specific problems include a lack of housing, high levels of unemployment, 
high levels of poverty, and food insecurity.  
External actors all too often easily seize on the combination of factors that are 
present in both refugee camps and quickly growing urban areas, and help explain why 
Muslims who do not fit the terrorist stereotype of being poor and marginalized are 
becoming radicalized and turning to militant Islam. One such example is Abdirahim 
Mohamed Abdullahi, the Kenyan lawyer who joined al-Shabaab and was one of the 
attackers killed at the Garissa University attack. Abdullahi’s background fails to fit the 
stereotype often associated with what is typical of militant Islamists in East Africa. 
Instead of being driven to this attack by a lack of education, economic opportunity, or 
political representation, it appears that Abdirahim was heavily influenced and radicalized 
by external actors such as al-Shabaab and the Islamic State. Specifically, media suggested 
                                                 
71 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “116 Somali Refugees from Kenya Land in 
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that the mastermind of the Garissa attack, Mohamed Kuno, was highly influential in 
Abdullahi’s recruitment and radicalization.74 A Kenyan news outlet also reported, 
The Daily Nation said a security briefing identifies Mohamed Kuno as a 
former teacher and principal at Madrasa Najah in Garissa. He worked 
there from 1997–2000, according to AllAfrica.com. He also worked for 
the Al Haramain Foundation between 1993 and 1995, when he was known 
as Sheikh Mahamad Afte, according to the website.75 
Kuno is now reported to be the al-Shabaab commander for Jubaland Somalia, and 
responsible for all al-Shabaab operations carried out in Kenya. His background as a 
principal, as well as his employment working for an Islamic NGO, supports the premise 
that targeting youth is a tactic purposely used to spread militant Islam within Kenya.  
Finally, the increased level of religiously-based violence has prompted various 
responses from the Kenyan government. One reaction has been an increase in policing 
actions based on demographics. Both Kenyan-Somalis and ethnic Somalis living in 
Kenya have viewed this as profiling. The police response has also often been heavy-
handed and, as described by Muhyadin Roble, is “marred by a lack of strategic goals and 
priorities as well as accusations of harassment, extortion and various other abuses.”76 For 
example, in April 2014, Kenyan local police forces moved into Somali neighborhoods in 
Nairobi and rounded up ethnic Somalis for questioning following a grenade attack at a 
Nairobi bus stop on April 2. At one point, over 4,000 ethnic Somalis were moved to the 
Safaricom football stadium in Nairobi to be questioned about this attack, as well as an 
explosion that had occurred two months prior.  
Although Eastleigh has been in the spotlight following the Westgate attack, the 
government cracked down again following the Garissa University attack. In this case, a 
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number of Kenyan-Somalis and ethnic Somalis were arrested, and a local Somali-owned 
money transfer system was shut down, bringing the financial activities of Somali-owned 
businesses to a halt.77  
c. Analysis 
This latest attack in Kenya highlights the ongoing predicaments confronted by the 
Kenyan government. Unfortunately, its chosen response appears to be to increase  
profiling of Muslims and ethnic Somalis. Following both the Westgate Mall and Garissa 
University attacks, the intensity of policing actions increased across Kenya. The 
unintended effect may be to push more youth to join extremist organizations, rather than 
the reverse.78  
4. October 15, 2012: Kwale, Kenya 
a. Event 
On October 15, 2012, just hours after a shootout with police and the arrest of 
Omar Mwamnuadzi, a local government official, Salim Changu, was found hacked to 
death at his house in Kombani, Kenya. The perpetrators of the attack were believed to be 
supporters of the Mombasa Republican Council, an organization based in Mombasa just 
25 miles to the north of Kombani. Local officials hinted that this was a revenge killing 
and Changu was targeted because he provided information that led to the arrest of 
Mwamnuadzi.  
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b. Background 
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not the only extremist groups operating in Kenya. 
Other groups with an enduring presence have also conducted religiously-based attacks. 
One of these is the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) which has existed since 1999. 
This Coast Province-based group is mainly Muslim. Although not as violent or 
widespread as al-Shabaab, the MRC has gained traction along the Swahili coast given 
political and economic grievances. Since 2008, the group has used violent protests to try 
to achieve its goal of seceding from Kenya. In the summer of 2014 alone, the MRC was 
accused of killing 87 people.79 Many of its attacks occurred at Western tourist locations, 
which have become common targets of terrorist groups in Kenya. In October of the same 
year, Kenyan police arrested 11 MRC members and its president Omar Mwamnuadzi. 
Although the MRC has often denied an alliance with al-Shabaab, it has copied some of 
al-Shabaab’s techniques, such as employing local religious leaders to incite violence, 
storing weapons in mosques, and conducting religious training in order to radicalize 
youth.80  
One common explanation for the increase in violence in Coast Province is based 
on coastal Muslims’ perception of being politically underrepresented. For example, 
Kenyan Muslims living along the Swahili coast often feel underrepresented within 
parliament, and argue that they are ruled by inland elites or that the Muslim members of 
parliament fail to support Muslim causes.81 As of 2010, Muslims were said to comprise 
7% of the total population of Kenya.82 Of the 337 members of parliament in 2014, at 
least 25 in the Senate and National Assembly are Muslim.83 This means that 
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approximately 7% of the parliament is Muslim.84 Consequently, the Muslim population 
appears to be fairly represented. However, as Kenyan Muslims point out, they are 
prohibited from forming their own political party. The Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) has 
been deemed illegal by the Kenyan government, which bans political parties that have a 
religious affiliation.85 Muslims often counter that most political parties in Kenya are 
primarily Christian, and thus Muslim parties are unfairly targeted for being Muslim.  
 Land ownership is yet another destabilizing factor used to incite violence along 
the coast and the MRC has used this topic around Mombasa to attract supporters. The 
decision to establish the entire 1,800 mile-long Swahili coastline as Muslim controlled 
land can be traced back the pre-colonial period. However, under colonial rule, this 10 
mile wide strip of land that extends for 1,800 miles along the Indian Ocean was shortened 
and then absorbed into Kenya. With independence in 1963, this land remained under the 
control of a few politically well-placed and often wealthy individuals. This has always 
rankled residents.86 But these tensions have also been exacerbated as members of other 
Kenyan tribes, specifically the Kikuyu, have used their political connections to purchase 
large sections of Coast Province land.87 Although these land sales begun under the first 
president Kenyatta decades ago, disenfranchisement of the local population continues.88   
In addition to land disputes, a recent survey of Coast Province sponsored by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides insights into 
other conditions that exist in the region. For instance, the report states, “As is the case 
across the rest of Kenya (and Africa), the Coast’s population is decidedly youthful: as a 
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whole, nearly half of the adult population (43%) is under 30 years of age.”89 Of these 
youth aged 18 to 29, 41% are Muslim.90 Additionally, Coast Province has a 28% 
unemployment rate.91 Simple math indicates that as many as 83,000 Muslim youth in 
Coast Province are unemployed. Unfortunately, Coast Province is not unique; the 
unemployment across the country is about 40%.92 
c. Analysis 
While the terrorist incident described was borne of grievances in Coast Province, 
these grievances are not isolated to Coast Province and can be found in other areas of 
Kenya. Grievances associated with land ownership, unemployment, and perceived 
political underrepresentation are fairly common. Meanwhile, the suspicion that the MRC 
has direct ties to al-Shabaab has never been proven. But both of these groups operate in 
Coast Province and often compete for the same youth population which increases the 
likelihood that these two organizations interact.  
B. SUMMARY OF KENYA 
In the seventeen years since the U.S. Embassy attack, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab 
have rooted themselves in Kenya. These organizations have proven able to successfully 
navigate social dynamics in Kenya. This includes understanding how to identify 
susceptible youth as recruits, whether from among marginalized Somali youth in 
Eastleigh or unemployed Kenyan Muslims along the Swahili coast. Additionally, al-
Shabaab has established and maintains a complex network for radicalization, training, 
and utilization in both Somalia and Kenya. However, not all of Kenya is facing the same 
level of religiously based attacks. Areas like Coast and North Eastern Provinces appear to 
be experiencing more violence than are other regions in the country. This is likely due to 
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their geographic proximity to Somalia and the associated spillover effects from Somalia’s 
instability. One such spillover effect is the ability for al-Shabaab to expand its operations 
beyond Somalia and establish al-Hijra as its Kenyan operational wing. Al-Shabaab’s 
focus on Kenya could be due to Kenya’s role in AMISOM, but there have been problems 
as far back as the Shifta War. What is certain is that Kenya is seeing a dramatic increase 
in religiously-based terrorist attacks. The Westgate Mall and Garissa University attacks 
are only the two most spectacular examples. This new trend has the potential to spill over 
and affect other East African countries, like Tanzania.  
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As we have seen, the spillage of militant Islam from Somalia and proliferation of 
more radical forms of Islam from external actors has had a dramatic effect in Kenya. 
Apart from the 1998 Embassy bombing, the rise of militant Islam within Tanzania has 
largely escaped notice beyond its borders. This has been deliberate by the Tanzanian 
government, which seeks to avoid labeling attacks as terrorism or as religiously-based 
violence perpetrated by militant Islamists, in an effort to maintain peace between its 
Muslim and Christian populations. However, the spillover effects of the situation in 
Somalia and the continued influence by other external actors are present and growing in 
Tanzania. These two factors have converged along with a Muslim youth bulge; militant 
Islam appears to be spreading in parts of the country as a result.  
Tanzania, comprised of Zanzibar (an archipelago) and mainland Tanganyika, is 
currently experiencing a youth bulge, especially within its Muslim population. The 
median age in Tanzania is 17.4 years old and the Muslim population is expected to 
increase by 44.71% from 2010 to 2030, rising from an estimated 13.4 million Muslims to 
19.4 million Muslims.93 A 2012 study points out that there will be an estimated 900,000 
youth coming of working age each year in Tanzania, while the market is only creating an 
estimated 50,000 to 60,000 new jobs per annum.94 Of those 900,000 new working age 
individuals, fewer than 5% have a secondary education level or higher.95 These statistics 
reveal a pool of young, unemployed, and under-educated Tanzanians who will be an 
obvious target for radicalization.  
The 1998 Embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam signals the first terrorist attack 
executed by an external actor, al-Qaeda, in Tanzania. However, since 2012, Tanzania has 
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experienced a growing number of militant attacks, which have specifically targeted 
Western tourists, local Christian leaders, Tanzanian security forces, and even moderate 
Muslims who speak out against radical forms of Islam. In Zanzibar, an acid attack on two 
British teens in 2013, as well as bombings of restaurants and bars frequented by Western 
tourists, and attacks on Christian churches and priests, illustrates the growth of militant 
Islam on the island. Mainland attacks in Tanzania by militant Islamists have also 
increased since 2012, often influenced by external actors. In February 2015, al-Shabaab 
militants engaged in a fierce firefight with Tanzanian police and military forces in the 
Amboni caves near the Tanga region where they had established a training camp. Also in 
2015, Tanzanian Muslim youth began raiding police stations throughout the country to 
steal weapons and apparently stockpile them for future use.96 Collectively, these events 
are beginning to serve as a wake-up call for the Tanzanian government, which is in the 
early stages of establishing policies to curb religious violence before it leads to a situation 
akin to that in Kenya.  
1. August 7, 1998: U.S. Embassy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
a. Event 
In a synchronized attack, al-Qaeda militants bombed both the United States 
Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi with vehicle-borne explosive devices. In the 
case of the attack in Dar es Salaam, an Egyptian al-Qaeda operative, Hamden Khalif 
Allah Awad, drove the truck containing the bomb. The explosion destroyed the entrance 
and collapsed an exterior wall of the Embassy. Fortunately, the effect of this bomb was 
much smaller than anticipated and casualties were lower than those in Nairobi, with 11 
people killed and 77 injured. However, the effects of the attack were felt throughout the 
region and globally.  
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b. Background 
Al-Qaeda quickly claimed responsibility for the attacks in Tanzania and Kenya. 
The Dar es Salaam attack was planned in an apartment in Nairobi by a team of experts 
from various parts of the world, including Ali Mohamed, a former Egyptian and U.S. 
Army soldier who recruited and trained extremists in Brooklyn.97 The al-Qaeda group 
formed for the attack was led by Khaled al Fawwaz, who was appointed by Osama Bin 
Laden and would frequently send surveillance footage of the embassies to Bin Laden in 
Afghanistan, illustrating the high level of control Bin Laden exercised throughout the 
operation.98   
The al-Qaeda operatives in Kenya started planning the Embassy attacks as early 
as 1995, but were unable to execute them due to difficulties that Bin Laden was facing in 
Sudan in 1995. His move to Afghanistan in 1996 further delayed the attacks. However, 
Sudan remained central to the preparations since Bin Laden owned a number of business 
fronts that operated throughout East Africa, to include a pharmaceutical business in 
Khartoum that allegedly produced nerve gas.99  
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan played indirect but supporting roles in the Dar 
es Salaam Embassy attack. Osama Bin Laden and Khaled al Fawwaz, both Saudis, had 
retained extensive ties in Saudi Arabia, even after they were exiled. Indeed, once 
preparations for the Embassy attacks were complete, most of the al-Qaeda planners and 
support network fled to Pakistan where they continued to support al-Qaeda.100  
Local Tanzanian youth, radicalized by al-Qaeda, were also integral to the attack. 
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailan, a young Muslim militant from Zanzibar who joined al-Qaeda 
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for the Embassy bombings, would later be the first al-Qaeda militant arrested and tried in 
the United States in connection with the Embassy bombings.101 His capture occurred in 
Pakistan in 2004, when he was arrested following a prolonged firefight. It was later 
reported by his fellow al-Qaeda operatives that Ghailan was one of the key explosives 
experts who acquired and assembled many of the bomb parts for both Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam.102 A 2002 Congressional Research Report on Terrorism in Africa produced by 
Ted Dagne, an African Affairs specialist, was later used by Jeffery Haynes as he 
summarized important aspects of the attacks’ success stating: 
From 1991, when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan, al-Qaeda has 
been building a network of Islamist groups in both the Horn of Africa 
(Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) and East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda). Dagne believes that, as in South Asia-especially Afghanistan 
and Pakistan-al-Qaeda was able to exploit extant circumstances of 
widespread poverty, ethnic and religious competition and conflict, poorly 
policed state borders, and often corrupt and inefficient government 
officials to create a regional “terror centre” in East Africa.103  
Although external actors perpetrated the embassy bombing, local support that was 
essential to its execution. This local support was relatively easy to generate given the 
conditions listed by Haynes, and thanks to a growing group number of radicalized 
Tanzanian youth.  
In Tanzania, there are real fears that more fundamentalist variants of Islam, such 
as Salafism or Wahabbism, have been spreading throughout the country.104 Spreading 
these radical forms of Islam is a deliberate strategy on the part of terrorist groups, like al-
Qaeda; prostelytizing is also undertaken by certain Middle Eastern states. This aim is to 
establish a foothold, and then grow from there. NGOs and Islamic Charities are often 
utilized to help with the spread.  
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For instances, NGOs are believed to have provided financial and logistical 
support to the organizers and executors of the 1998 Embassy bombings; they are thought 
to have solicited money from the Muslim community on behalf of the al-Qaeda cell in 
Tanzania.105 One method they used was to ask for money for community projects, only 
to then divert the money to terror activities.106 NGOs are also believed to have helped 
members of al-Qaeda operating in Kenya and Tanzania acquire bomb-making materials 
and expertise from abroad.107  
NGOs are not the only conduits used. Within Tanzania, state sponsors of 
terrorism have been meddling in local Muslim affairs for quite some time. This is most 
evident in Zanzibar, where more than 95% of the population is Muslim. Zanzibar has 
produced at least three mid-level al-Qaeda operatives who fought in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and although neither of these countries directly sponsored these individuals, it is 
no secret that al-Qaeda received support from the Taliban when the Taliban was in power 
in Afghanistan, as well as clandestine support from elements within the Pakistani 
government.108 As Haynes also notes, “In recent years the U.S. and British governments 
have expressed concern that external extremist influences-from, inter alia, Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia-have infiltrated Tanzania, serving to radicalise indigenous Muslim beliefs 
and undermining Tanzania’s well known political moderation.”109 
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When it comes to state actors, Saudi Arabia currently has the most influence over 
Muslims on the mainland while Oman is extremely influential in Zanzibar. Recently, the 
Jamestown Foundation has found that the Saudi Oil firm, Oilcom, moves over $1 million 
USD a year into Zanzibar, of which at least some portion is used to bribe government 
officials to back Wahhabism, and to purchase small arms to support militant Islamist 
groups.110 Qatar has likewise been supporting Salafists financially since the late 1970s 
and, according to Hussein Solomon, Islamic militancy in sub-Saharan Africa would not 
be as severe a problem if it were not for these countries’ contributions.111 For example, a 
2012 article in the Washington Post highlights U.S. concerns over Qatar’s support to al-
Shabaab, which was brought to the U.S.’s attention by the President of Somalia, Sharif 
Ahmed, in 2009.112 The Somalia president’s assertion was that Qatar had been funneling 
financial support to al-Shabaab via Eritrea. Qatari individuals and organizations, too have 
funded al-Shabaab. In 2013, the United States Department of Treasury listed Abdul 
Rahman al-Nuaimi, a Qatari academic and co-founder of Al Karama, a Swiss-based 
human rights NGO, as an al-Qaeda financier who had sent an estimated $2 million USD a 
month to Al-Qaeda in Iraq and $250,000 a month to al-Shabaab in Somalia.113    
A new East African terrorist organization focused on attacks within both Kenya 
and Tanzania has just emerged in early 2015. This new organization, al-Muhajiroun in 
East Africa, has direct links to al-Shabaab and its Kenyan offshoot al-Hijra.114 In the first 
addition of al-Shabaab’s new magazine, AMKA, the organization calls for East Africans 
to join the jihad, specifically those who are under “the illusion they could endure the 
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Kuffar’s humiliation in places like Kenya and Tanzania.”115 Increased focus within East 
Africa by al-Shabaab can be viewed as an expansion of its area of operation from 
Somalia.  
c. Analysis 
External actor influence, by terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, as well as by 
Islamic NGOs and states such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar, have helped proliferate 
the spread of militant Islam within Tanzania. The 1998 Embassy bombings illustrate the 
networked nature of these entities, which operated freely in the area until 2001, when the 
U.S. and Tanzanian governments took steps to target businesses and charities associated 
with al-Qaeda.116 For a period following the 1998 bombings, Tanzania was relatively 
free of attacks associated with militant Islam, and only since 2012 have such events 
begun to increase at a higher rate.  
2. August 7, 2013: Stone Town, Zanzibar Island 
a. Event 
On the evening of August 7, 2013, two British citizens, Katie Gee and Kristie 
Trup, were walking down a crowded avenue in Stone Town, Zanzibar. These young girls 
had just finished a month of volunteer teaching service at a local school on the island and 
were preparing to head back to England. Suddenly, a motorbike approached and two 
males threw acid in the faces of the women. Katie Gee suffered the most, with chemical 
burns across more than 30% of her body. This attack was not the first time Westerners on 
the island or Christians who inhabit Zanzibar have been target. Between 2012 and 2014, 
at least nine attacks occurred; all were perpetrated by Muslims who seek the institution of 
Sharia law and autonomy for Zanzibar.117 Figure 9 depicts the increase of attacks over 
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time in Tanzania. Not depicted are the figures from 2015, when at least eight attacks have 
occurred that are directly attributable to militant Islamist.118  
Figure 9.  Tanzania Terrorist Attacks, 1998–2014 
 
Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. 
b. Background 
While the one-party state of Tanzania forbade religiously-based political parties 
beginning at independence, Muslim associations run by the state were created. These 
associations were tasked with overseeing social, religious, and educational matters, while 
also acting as brokers between the government and Muslim communities. Subsequently, 
the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA), which is the overarching body 
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sanctioned by the government, plays an important role.119 Although the government does 
not collect statistics relating to religion, it is estimated that Muslims comprise between 
30% and 40% of Tanzania’s population. The government routinely goes out of its way to 
not marginalize any one’s religion. Worth noting is that it is also official policy for the 
presidency to rotate between Christians and Muslims. However, even with this 
alternation of power, Zanzibar continues to be at odds with mainland Tanganyika. This 
has been so since the Republic of Tanzania joined Zanzibar with Tanganyika in 1964.  
Zanzibar is an archipelago off the eastern coast of present day Tanzania; its two 
largest islands, Unguja and Pemba, are also most populated. The island of Unguja was 
first used as a port by slave and spice traders during their long trips between the Middle 
East and India, to mainland Africa. One of the first mosques in the southern hemisphere 
was built on this island in 1107.120 Following a long period of local rule, Oman absorbed 
Zanzibar in 1698 along with substantial portions of the Swahili coast.121 The Sultan of 
Zanzibar continued to rule under Omani suzerainty until 1890 when it transferred to the 
British Empire.  
Britain assumed a prominent role in administering Zanzibar and governed until its 
independence in 1963.122 During this time, Arab elites continued to play prominent roles 
in the islands’ administration and economy where they had been entrenched for centuries. 
Shortly following independence, Zanzibar underwent a brief but violent revolution in 
January 1964. The Sultan of Zanzibar and the recently elected government were 
overthrown. During the revolution, non-Africans—predominantly those of Arab and 
Indian descent—were murdered; as many as 20,000 may have been killed (estimates vary 
between 5–20,000). An estimated 100,000 were exiled. Many fled back to Oman or 
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India.123 Once the revolution was over, the new government signed an agreement of 
confederation with mainland Tanganyika to form the present-day United Republic of 
Tanzania. This agreement has been a point of consternation between the island’s largely 
Muslim population and the predominantly Christian mainland.  
Beyond its storied history, we also have to consider Zanzibar’s present day 
demographics within its population. According to a 2013 UN report which uses 
Tanzanian census data, over 35% of Zanzibar’s 1.3 million inhabitants are between the 
ages of 15 and 35.124 Further, an estimated 43.8% of the population is below the age of 
15.125 This puts 78% of Zanzibar’s population under the age of 35. While, this statistic 
may not be terribly alarming on its own, couple this with the fact that the male 
unemployment rate for 15 to 35 year olds is 43%, while for women it is 57% in Zanzibar, 
and this creates certain exploitable vulnerabilities.126 Doing the math, approximately 
148,000 to 224,000 Muslim youth in Zanzibar are unemployed.  
Politically, Zanzibar attempted to join the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC), formerly known as the Organization of Islamic Conference, to further distance 
itself from the mainland. It did so in 1993, but then quickly withdrew under pressure 
from the mainland that, as a secular country, joining of a religious international 
organization was unconstitutional. This issue still upsets many Zanzibaris who saw 
economic as well as religious benefits from joining the organization.127 The Tanzanian 
government is also seen as infringing on Zanzibar’s autonomy in contravention of the 
1964 union.128   
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Much as in Mombasa, Kenya, political violence in Zanzibar has a heavy religious 
tone. A group known as Uamsho, which is Swahili for “The Awakening,” has become the 
main group to voice concerns over both political and economic inequality, territorial 
disputes, and religious suppression. The Zanzibar government contributed to the 
formation of Uamsho by allowing it to register in 2001 as an NGO under the Society Act 
of 1995.129  Ironically, Uamsho seeks Zanzibari independence. In addition to 
independence, Uamsho wants Zanzibar to be governed in accordance with Sharia law.130 
Not surprisingly, given Zanzibar’s predominant Muslim population, Uamsho enjoys a 
large base of support.131    
Zanzibar has also experienced continued meddling by external actors. Given 
Oman historical role in Zanzibar, ties between Uamsho and Omani patrons shouldn’t be  
surprising. A large number of Omani Arab-Africans left the island’s following the 1963 
revolution. Their need to suddenly depart their homes had a profound effect on many. At 
least some members of the “forgotten generation” of Arab Zanzibaris’ desire to return to 
Zanzibar.132 This group’s influence on Zanzibar politics and economics has remained 
substantial. In fact, according to Daniel Howden, “Much of the political establishment on 
Zanzibar insist in private that wealthy outsiders from the Gulf States or Iran are suspected 
of backing Uamsho.”133 Furthermore, Uamsho’s leader Shaykh Farid frequently travels 
to Oman and allegations have been made that he previously served in the Omani infantry 
before becoming Uamsho’s leader.134   
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Although Saudi Arabia does not have the same historical ties with Zanzibar, it has 
recently emerged as another Uamsho donor and likewise contributes to other Sunni 
organizations in Zanzibar. Katrina Manson reports that, “Academics estimate that Saudi 
Arabia—where Wahhabi Islam is practiced—alone spends one million USD a year on 
Islamic institutions in Zanzibar.”135 She quotes a local Sufi Muslim teacher, Idrissa 
Ahmad Khamis who claims, “Wahhabi madrasas are just starting—they are now many 
and Saudi funds are spreading their work—they have nice buildings, they are well off and 
well organised; they preach and convince the parents to come there, so the effect of the 
madrassa is very powerful.”136  
The association of Wahhabism with militant Islam is well documented, and its 
proliferation on Zanzibar at the very least seems to correlate with the rise in religious 
violence there.137 Through 2013, this violence had in large part stayed contained to 
Zanzibar. Only recently has it begun to present a growing threat to the Tanzania mainland 
just a short distance away.138 
c. Analysis 
Zanzibar’s predominantly Muslim population is strikingly young and is plagued 
by unemployment. Political discontent between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar further 
alienates many Zanzibaris. External actors, who have long played a role in Zanzibar 
continue to do so. Together, these factors help account for the growth of radical Islam—
which has at times turned militant, as seen in attacks on Christian Tanzanians and 
Western tourists.  
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3. February 16, 2015: Amboni Caves near Tanga, Tanzania 
a. Event 
In February 2015, local police forces attempted to arrest what were thought to be 
bandits hiding deep in the Amboni Caves near the city of Tanga in northern Tanzania. 
Following an intense twenty-minute gunfight, the local police were forced to call for 
military backup from the Tanzania People’s Defense Forces. During the initial exchange 
of gunfire, a Tanzanian police officer was killed and five were wounded.139 The militants 
eventually escaped by using a complex system of ladders and ropes.140 Shortly following 
the event, a video was posted online by al-Shabaab claiming responsibility for the attack.  
b. Background 
Two years before the Tanga cave raid; al-Shabaab was already operating in the 
region. In October 2013, 69 people were arrested in the area for running an al-Shabaab 
indoctrination camp, where over 50 children between ages four and thirteen were being 
trained.141 Reportedly, many of the 69 people arrested were from Kenya and Somalia and 
included radical preachers.142 The camp had been operating since early 2008 and had 
already sent militants to Somalia to fight for al-Shabaab.  
Additional incidents involving al-Shabaab in Tanzania have occurred. Also in 
October 2013, eleven al-Shabaab militants were arrested while performing what were 
said to be military drills in a forested part of southern Mtwara Region.143 During the 
arrest, authorities found a compact disk (CD) labeled “New Mogadishu Sniper - Al 
Shabaab.”144 In March 2014, another al-Shabaab CD containing propaganda was 
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recovered following a militant attack on a moderate Sheikh and his son; the Sheikh 
refused to preach about jihad at his mosque.145 As LeSage summarizes what has been 
happening, “As part of its guerrilla strategy, al Shabab has increased its rate of external 
attacks across East Africa.”146  
Telling too, and unlike most al-Shabaab’s propaganda, the video released 
following the Amboni Cave attack was posted in Swahili. It has been thought for some 
time that Tanzania has served as a rear base area for al-Shabaab providing it a location 
where it can recruit, and offer fighters rest and recuperation.147 For instance, 16 al-
Shabaab suspects were arrested in May of 2014, in Arusha for allegedly running an 
underground recruitment and training camp for al-Shabaab.148 All of the 16 militants 
arrested were Muslim males between the ages of 25 and 46, some of whom were 
prominent business Arusha figures.149 Arusha has been home to a Somali community for 
generations. But, it is mostly along the coast where Tanzanian officials are concentrating 
their efforts.150 This is because of how easy it is for al-Shabaab to move by sea between 
Kenya, Tanzania, and back to Somalia.  
Tanga is a port city on the Indian Ocean with a majority Muslim population. 
Although actual demographic information, including on religious affiliation, is difficult to 
find, figures from studies in the 1970s suggest upwards of 71.9% of the population in the 
city is Muslim.151 A 2012 census places the current population of the city at 
approximately 273,000 inhabitants. A recent program designed to address unemployment 
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estimates that 24,000 youth are unemployed.152 Alone, these statistics are not overly 
alarming and resemble the country’s overall 10% unemployment rate. However, external 
actors have taken advantage of these conditions in Tanga to radicalize Muslim youth who 
have few prospects elsewhere.  
The Ansar Muslim Youth Center (AMYC) is a Muslim youth movement based in 
Tanga. It has been there since the 1970s and has mosques throughout the country. In 
2012 it announced ties to the MYC in Kenya and Somalia.153 The AMYC reportedly  
recruits fighters and provide substantial funding to al-Shabaab. AMYC was confirmed to 
have provided support to al-Qaeda in East Africa as long ago as the 1998 embassy 
bombings.154 AMYC also maintains lucrative ties to drug trafficking networks that use 
the Tanga port to move heroin and other drugs, as well as ivory and gems.155 Figure 10 
below highlights the fact that Tanzania as one of the main hubs used to move opiates 
from Southwest Asia into the global market and to the United States. Thus, while Tanga 
might seem to be a forgotten backwater; it is yet another node in the nexus of crime, 
terrorism and Islamist agitation.   
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Figure 10.  Global Trafficking Flows of Opiates 
 
Source: United Nations, “World Drug Report,” United Nations Office on  
Drugs and Crime, 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2015 
/World_Drug_Report_2015.pdf.  
c. Analysis 
 The spillover effects from Somalia’s decades of unrest appear to have 
found sympathetic ears in Tanzania, and what was once only a source of tacit support and 
individual actors operating covertly in the country has begun to turn into a growing threat 
for mainland Tanzania. Notably, much of al-Shabaab’s influence in Tanzania has a local 
flavor to it, as most of its supporters are not of Somali descent.156  
A critical aspect of raids like the Amboni cave raid is that, authorities have taken 
preemptive action. Individuals and cells have in large part been discovered by vigilant  
local Tanzanians. To its credit, Tanzania still maintains a robust 10-cell system. The 10-
cell system acts in the manner of a neighborhood watch: a cell leader is elected for every 
10 adjacent homes, and that leader is responsible for organizing and watching over his 
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cell’s inhabitants and property, as well as serving as an informal administrator and link to 
local authorities. The system is a legacy program from shortly after Tanzanian’s 
independence when the one party state used it for security and political control.157 One 
by-product of this system has made it very difficult for outsiders to penetrate many rural 
areas in Tanzania, and has even proven effective in some urban areas. Worth noting is 
that the system does not exist on Zanzibar, which maintains its own system known as 
Shehias which performs a similar function.158 During our research trip to Tanzania, this 
system was often cited by U.S. and Tanzanian defense and government officials alike, as 
being essential to successfully identifying potential attackers and preventing attacks.159  
4. July 12, 2015: Stakishari Police Station in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
a. Event 
Late in the evening of July 12, 2015, the Stakishari Police Station in Dar es 
Salaam was attacked by armed gunmen. The gunmen posed as civilians and made their 
way into the police station before opening fire. At the conclusion of the attack, four 
police officers and two civilians were dead and others lay wounded as gunmen made a 
getaway with an undisclosed amount of guns and ammunition. The perpetrators were 
apprehended eight days later. This was not the first such attack, and at least four other 
attacks using similar tactics have occurred since 2014.160 In 2015 alone, 11 officers have 
been killed and dozens of guns and cases of ammunitions have been taken during these 
attacks.  
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b. Background 
The Stakishari Police Station attack helped shed light on  spate of police station 
attacks thanks to the apprehension of four suspects. The defendants Omari Abdula 
Makota, 28; Rajabu Ally Mohamed Ulatule, 22; Ramadhani Hamis Ulatule, 20; and 
Fadhil Shaban Lukwembe, 23, have all been charged with murder and were initially 
labeled as “gangsters” by local police and the media.161 However, the Tanzanian 
government has since changed the charges and all four individuals are now classified as 
terrorists.162 This is typical; Tanzania has taken a quiet and secretive approach to dealing 
with violence associated with militant Islam, often deliberately not calling the suspects 
militants or terrorists, and rarely, if ever, discussing their religious motivations. 
Interestingly, immediately following the attack, police put out a call to the public to be on 
the lookout for more suspects and to not allow places of worship to be used as locations 
in which to hide or from which to plan such incidents.163 This deliberate tactic by the 
Tanzanian government and security forces of not acknowledging the growing threat 
posed by militant Islamists while simultaneously singling out places of worship as safe-
havens for attackers represents a disturbing contradiction.  
The country’s National Counter Terrorism Center in 2015 has made four specific 
assertions in regard to the growing number of attacks on police stations. First, it says 
there are no terrorist groups presently based in Tanzania. Second, it acknowledges more 
individuals are supporting terrorist groups. Third, most of the 2015 attacks were 
conducted by small bands of criminals who are not tied to one specific group. Fourth, it 
has classified these attackers as individual jihadists or Islamist militants, not as part of a 
terrorist group.164  
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c. Analysis 
The fact that the four suspects arrested were young Tanzanian Muslims who are 
apparently part of a larger cell of militant Islamists proved alarming for Tanzania. Given 
the rise in number of attacks since 2012 it appears that the attacks in Tanzania have 
finally been recognized by the government as being associated with militant Islam.  
B. SUMMARY OF TANZANIA 
External influences supporting the spread of militant Islam have been present in 
Tanzania for some time. In Zanzibar, history has played an important role in regard to 
Omani influence, as seen in the case of Uamsho. Saudi Arabia has entered the mix as a 
relatively new player, but has already made an impact in spreading Wahhabi ideology 
across the island and from there onto the mainland. On both the mainland and Zanzibar, 
al-Qaeda was able to take advantage of Islamic NGOs and charities to assist it with  
recruiting, logistics, and attacks. Given Tanzania’s demographics, there are growing 
numbers of young, unemployed Muslims. They provide external actors with a large pool 
from which to recruit. Local organizations, like the AMYC, also provide platforms for 
anyone who wants to advance their Islamist agenda. It is a small wonder that militant 
Islam is expanding, though fortunately Tanzania is not yet host to as many 
disenfranchised communities as Kenya, though it has some of the same vulnerabilities. 
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IV. CASE COMPARISON 
The upward trend in attacks caused by militant Islamists in Kenya and Tanzania 
cannot be attributed to a single set of circumstances or conditions. Instead, a number of 
factors, to include spillover from Somalia, an increased number of external actors, and a 
susceptible Muslim youth population are contributing to the rise in violence. However, 
similarities and differences are worth highlighting between the two cases so that reasons 
for the spread of militant Islam can be better understood and counteracted.  
A. SIMILARITIES 
In 1998, both countries were targeted by al-Qaeda. Since al-Qaeda’s early days, 
Kenya has experienced more religiously-based violence than Tanzania. However, many 
of the conditions that have allowed the violence to propagate in Kenya also appear to 
exist in Tanzania. What is also similar to both countries is that the recent domestic 
terrorist attacks have been rarely carried out by homegrown or self-radicalized 
organizations, and were almost always influenced by external actors. These external 
actors provided the funding, training, tactics, and ideology that were used by local and 
foreign Islamist militants combined. Additionally, the individual militants who conducted 
these attacks were often foreign nationals who were sent by external actors to conduct 
specific terrorist actions.  
One recent development in both Kenya and Tanzania is that militants specifically 
seek to isolate victims during the course of their attacks; their violence is focused against 
non-Muslims. This was blatant in the Westgate Mall and Garissa University attacks, but 
was also an underlying factor in the 2013 Zanzibar acid attack against two British girls.  
Islamists continue to push for more Sharia law to be practiced throughout the 
Coast and North Eastern Provinces in Kenya.165 External actors are pushing for the same 
in parts of Tanzania and in Zanzibar. For instance, in Tanzania, the increase in the 
number of mosques associated with more radical forms of Islam, as opposed to the 
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traditional Sufism practiced in the area, has been a cause for concern among moderate 
Muslims.166 This influx of external actors attempting to spread a more radical form of 
Islam presents the potential to further destabilize the balance between religion and 
politics.  
Political representation appears to be more proportional than Muslims in Kenya 
and Tanzania realize. Muslims currently account for roughly 7% of the population in 
Kenya, and approximately 7% of the members of Kenya’s parliament are Muslim. 
Tanzanian Muslims make up approximately 30% of the overall population and the state’s 
parliament is nearly equally split between Muslim and Christian members. Additional 
evidence about the religious parity in Tanzania’s government includes the fact that the 
newly elected president is Christian and his chosen vice president is Muslim. This overall 
equity in religious representation calls into question the argument that militant Islam 
spreads thanks to a lack of political representation.  
One other important feature both countries share is the impact of terrorism on 
tourism. There has been a drastic loss of tourism revenue due to the specific targeting of 
Westerners and areas they frequent.167 This loss in revenue, estimated at $200 million 
annually in Kenya alone, not only hits business owners, but also the substantial number 
of workers in the industry.168 The fact that a large percentage of tourism sites are located 
in predominately Muslim majority areas exacerbates the situation, because this feeds 
unemployment. The lack of jobs then impacts those who already feel discriminated 
against, stoking conditions conductive to radicalization.  
                                                 
166 LeSage, “The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional 
Threats.” 
167 Both Tanzania and Kenya have seen a notable decline in tourism revenue due to terrorist activities. 
Elayne Wangalwa, “Kenyan Tourism Faces Negative Impact Due to Domestic Terrorism,” February 12, 
2015, http://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/east-africa/2014/05/27/kenyan-tourism-faces-negative-impact-due-
to-domestic-terrorism/; Spencer, “Zanzibar, Muslims bomb cathedral and tourist bar.” 
168 Jacob Kushner, “Mall Attack to Cost Kenya $200 Million in Tourism,” USA Today, October 1, 
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/01/kenya-mall-attack-tourism/2903005/. 
 59
B. DIFFERENCES  
One key difference between Kenya and Tanzania is Kenya’s involvement in 
Somalia. Unlike Tanzania, Kenya is a Troop Contributing Country (TCC) to AMISOM, 
as previously discussed. This by itself has made Kenya a target of al-Shabaab. But its 
economic and political dabbling within Somalia, especially in Kismayo, has further 
enraged many Somalis. For example, in July 2015, Somalia brought a legal case to the 
United Nations International Court of Justice. Somalia is disputing the maritime border it 
shares with Kenya and claims that Kenya has illegally handed out exploratory contracts 
to international businesses for potential oil and gas deposits within parts of the Indian 
Ocean that actually belong to Somalia.169 These types of tensions fuel al-Shabaab’s ire 
and affect militant Islamists’ attitude toward the Kenyan government.  
Kenya’s proximity to Somalia and the spillover effects from Somalia’s internal 
instability also challenge Kenya in different ways than they do Tanzania. The long border 
shared by Kenya and Somalia is very porous and often not well patrolled. This provides 
the opportunity for terrorist groups to seek sanctuary in Somalia and cross the border into 
Kenya and conduct attacks. This proximity to Somalia has also forced Kenya to manage 
an ongoing humanitarian disaster, as large numbers of Somalis have moved to Kenya in 
order to escape the violence inside their home country. Especially alarming is that 
refugee camps and cities with majority ethnic Somali populations in Kenya have served 
as safe havens and recruiting grounds for extremist groups. This is evident in both 
Dadaab and Eastleigh.   
Tanzania is more distant from Somalia and does not face these same challenges. 
And though this geographic separation has provided Tanzania with a buffer from the 
spillover effects from Somalia’s internal instability, recent events indicate that al-
Shabaab may be expanding its operations further south. Unique to Tanzania, meanwhile, 
are the shared economic and ideological ties that exist along the Swahili coast, and that 
tie Tanzania to Oman. Thus, while Tanzania’s physical and cultural distance have 
prevented total ease of movement of Somali-based extremist groups into Tanzania, 
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Tanzania has other militant Islamic group to contend with that receive assistance from 
external sources. This can be seen in the number of madrassas constructed and supported 
by Saudi Arabia.  
Tanzania also faces complex challenges of managing the semi-autonomous region 
of Zanzibar. In principle, Zanzibar is entirely Muslim and has a history of secessionist 
agitation. As seen in the recent acid attacks, as well as in the killing of Catholic priests, 
Zanzibar’s political struggle for more autonomy is starting to feed more religiously-based 
violence. At the same time, the nature of the political divide between Muslims and non-
Muslims is much different than in Kenya. Tanzania’s closely balanced religious 
population has forced its government to take a much more conservative approach, and it 
carefully monitors how religion is intersecting with politics.  
Unlike Kenya, Tanzania also employs a system of community watch. Each leader 
in the 10-cell system reports any abnormal activity to a higher-level leader and to local 
police. This system has proved to be a highly efficient and effective mechanism for 
deterring and monitoring all kinds of external influences, to include militant Islam. For 
instance, a rickshaw driver recently alerted authorities to a potential terrorist. This single 
report led to the arrest of a number of al-Shabaab sympathizers in the Kilombero District 
of Morogoro Region Tanzania.170  
                                                 
170  Brigadier General S. M. Minja, (Tanzanian People’s Defense Forces National Defense College), 
in discussion with the authors, September 8, 2015.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The spread of militant Islam in Kenya and Tanzania has occurred under varied 
conditions and circumstances. The influences affecting this spread have also changed 
over time for innumerable reasons; however, some of the most potent recent factors are 
the spillover of violence from Somalia coupled with the convergence of external actors 
and a large Muslim youth population.  
In the case of Kenya, the spread of militant Islam appears to be increasing. Not 
only should the growth of militant Islam be a concern to the Kenyan government, but it 
should also be a concern for Kenya’s East African neighbors and the larger global 
community. This is especially true for the United States, which has longstanding ties with 
Kenya and considers Kenya to be the anchor state of East Africa.171 This relationship was 
highlighted several months ago when in July 2015 President Obama became the first 
sitting U.S. President to visit Kenya.  
In Tanzania, indicators suggest that politically motivated entities are increasingly 
willing to use violence. Tanzania holds even greater potential for large-scale violence by 
militant Islamists than Kenya does. We say this based on the history of tension between 
the mainland and Zanzibar, coupled with the near parity between Muslims and 
Christians; once large-scale violence takes off it might become extremely difficult to 
control. That said, the relative parity between Muslims and Christians and their 
coexistence in the same communities have been driving factors in maintaining political 
and social stability in the country to date. However, should the balance be tipped by the 
efforts of an external actor who finds traction among Muslim youth, Tanzania could find 
itself in peril.  
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A. WHY IT MATTERS TO KENYA AND TANZANIA 
In a soon-to-be published work, Michael Freeman, Katherine Ellena, and Amina 
Kator-Mubarez suggest that those who spread extremist Islamic ideology deliberately use 
non-state elements to proliferate their message. Freeman et al. describe Salafi and 
Wahhabi efforts as the “supply” aspect of Islamism, akin to how a marketing firm would 
push a product.172 According to LeSage, more mosques and madrassas are being built in 
East Africa, and that these are directly associated with more radical forms of Islam.173 
Also, officials in Tanzania suggest that some of those who travel to the Middle East and 
Pakistan for religious education return home subscribing to more radical forms of Islam 
than are traditional in East Africa.174 Equally significant, more and more Arab Muslim 
professors are now teaching in East African universities, such as at the Muslim 
University of Morogoro in Tanzania. One thus sees new nodes in networks that have long 
connected East Africa with the Middle East.  
1. Recommendations for East Africa Region 
1. Understand the Muslim youth population. This thesis highlights the growing 
number of pernicious external actors present in the East Africa region. Some of these 
actors have longstanding ties to Muslim communities, but there are also a growing 
number of new actors. It may be a truism, but competing groups always need new human 
capital; the easiest place to find new recruits is among youth. But youth can also provide 
a powerful resistance front against malign influence, and both Kenya and Tanzania need 
to embrace the growing Muslim population. Actions should be taken to encourage 
moderate religious practices and to support moderate religious leaders who have a direct 
tie-in to at-risk youth. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has found that “East 
African Somali populations, especially those in neighborhoods of large cities like Addis 
Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Mombasa, and Nairobi, have experienced the negative 
                                                 
172 Michael Freeman, Katherine Ellena and Amina Kator-Mubarez, Ideology without Borders: The 
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174 Augustine Philip Mahiga, (Former Tanzanian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) and UN 
Special Representative to Somalia), in discussion with the authors, September 7, 2015.  
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consequences of al-Shabaab’s activities and often strongly oppose its objectives.”175 
Populations within these cities are beginning to actively participate in community 
projects which “serve as powerful counter-narratives that civil society organizations and 
governments should encourage when possible.”176 All such endeavors should be 
encouraged.  
2. Engage the youth through social programs. Dynamic social programs can also 
be created and managed by local leaders. A study in South Korea found that “the 
country’s youth bulge was converted into a national asset through a blend of educational 
programs and youth-oriented services that prepared young people for jobs in a modern 
and globally connected economy.”177 Similar programs in Kenya and Tanzania could be 
established. Such programs would ideally provide alternative outlets to help increase ties 
between youth and their home communities. If youth were employed doing something 
productive, this would surely undercut the ability of external actors to find recruits.  
2. Recommendations for Kenya 
1. Get serious about Somalia, but ensure that efforts are legitimate. Somalia’s 
stability is of key importance to Kenya. Kenya has made a significant investment in its 
support to AMISOM and continues to host hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees. 
However, Kenya’s actions inside Somalia, specifically in Kismayo, have proven to be 
less than altruistic and have lent the perception that Kenya is meddling in Somalia’s 
affairs. This perceived meddling has been used by al-Shabaab to rally support for its 
attacks in Kenya.  
2. Create an internal counterterrorism force. The Westgate Mall siege exposed 
serious gaps in the capabilities of the Kenyan police and military to conduct internal 
counterterrorism operations. Both the police and military are highly trained and capable 
of conducting unilateral operations; however, their joint response at Westgate was 
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uncoordinated. The Kenyan government should strongly consider a unified command that 
would be responsible for internal counterterrorism operations.  
3. Recommendations for Tanzania 
1. Continue the 10-cell system and refocus efforts in urban areas. Tanzania 
should put more emphasis on its 10-cell system. This effort is especially important in 
areas that are known to be penetrated by militant Islamist groups. At ground level, more 
formalized links should be instituted between local police and the 10-cell leaders. 
Tanzania should also create an operational level control mechanism that can coordinate 
counterterrorism efforts among all of its security elements.  
2. Reinstitute government programs and national service. The Tanzanian 
government should consider reintroduction of youth league activities for those under the 
age of 15. This program proved successful in building character and in instilling national 
pride among this age group in the past. More importantly, however, Tanzanians above the 
age of 18 should be required to participate in compulsory national service for at least one 
year. National service could include working with any national level security force or 
government service, to include holding an official position within the 10-cell system’s 
militia.  
3. Acknowledge growth of militant Islam in the region and reform the legal code 
to properly address it. Legal reforms, specifically within the realm of counterterrorism 
legislation, must be undertaken. In conjunction with refining the laws for easier 
application, which means making laws shorter and clearer, the Tanzanian government 
must come to terms with the growing threat from militant Islamist attacks and discuss the 
problem more openly. By being more transparent—to include being more transparent 
about the need for legal reforms—the government will better position itself to properly 
classify individuals or groups as terrorists, and to charge them accordingly.  
4. Monitor and manage external influence. The government of Tanzania must 
also enhance its maritime, air, and land border security posture to prevent ease of transit 
by militant Islamists or their supporters into and through Tanzania. The Tanzanian 
government should also establish a system to better account for and track the plethora of 
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NGOs and other external actors operating within its borders to ensure that none are 
complicit in the spread of militant Islam in Tanzania. 
B. WHY IT MATTERS TO THE UNITED STATES 
The 2015 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) covers a broad range of 
efforts to undertake and promote the security of the United States and to further its 
national interests. In Africa, the strategy focuses on two important goals. First is the 
transition of delivering aid to a trade and development approach that will strengthen 
economic ties between the U.S. and African countries.178 Not surprisingly, the title of the 
section of the NSS on sub-Saharan Africa is “Invest in Africa’s Future.”  
Second, the NSS seeks to address democracy promotion and the building and 
strengthening of institutions to promote good governance. In this regard, the NSS notes 
the importance of changing demographics in Africa and the significance of the youth 
bulge on the continent.179 The youth bulge is also mentioned in the 2015 Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) Posture Statement that General Rodriquez briefed to the U.S. 
Congress. In this report, projections suggest that by 2050, one in four people in the world 
will live on the continent of Africa.180 The report also estimates that 41% of Africa’s 
current population is under the age of 15, and it predicts that this number is expected to 
rise.181 For these reasons, AFRICOM lists “Countering of Violent Extremism and 
Enhancing Stability in East Africa” as its number one priority.182   
Meanwhile, if one looks at U.S. government aid, more goes to East Africa than to 
any other sub-region of the continent. Excluding Egypt, Kenya is the number one 
recipient of U.S. foreign aid in Africa, and is slated to receive over $630 million in 
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2015.183 Coming in third for U.S. foreign aid in Africa is Tanzania, at nearly $560 
million for 2015.184 Considering these figures, it becomes clear that U.S. interests in East 
Africa are substantial.  
Another way to measure the importance of East Africa to the U.S. is by looking at 
Washington’s diplomatic commitments. The U.S. diplomatic mission in Kenya started in 
1964 and, according to a 2012 United States Department of State Office of Inspector 
General report, Nairobi is home to the largest U.S. Embassy in Africa. At the time of the 
report, the embassy employed over 1,300 people across 19 federal agency offices. Of 
these 1,300 employees, 400 were American.185 The United States’ bilateral relationship 
with Tanzania began even earlier—in 1961. According to a 2010 report, the U.S. 
Embassy in Dar es Salaam is smaller than Nairobi’s, with fewer than 100 American 
employees and approximately 300 locally employed staff supporting eight federal 
agencies.186  
However, despite these sizable embassies there is a gap in the United States’ 
diplomatic presence in the region. Following the onset of the Somali civil war, the U.S. 
Department of State closed its embassy in Mogadishu in January 1991. Until recently, the 
Department of State Somalia Affairs Unit has operated out of Nairobi with a staff of 
approximately 15 employees, 12 of whom are U.S. personnel.187 In September 2015, this 
unit was upgraded to an official U.S. Mission to Somalia with plans to reopen an 
embassy in Mogadishu.188 The move back into Somalia is a big step for the State 
Department. But more importantly, this move signifies the United States’ commitment to 
the country and region writ large.   
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1. Recommendation for the United States 
According to the National Security Strategy, the United States will continue to 
invest in the future of sub-Saharan Africa. The most prudent form of investment would 
be via smart power. As first defined by Joseph Nye, smart power reflects “the ability to 
combine hard and soft power into a successful strategy.”189 It should be noted that this 
type of approach takes time to mature. This is often difficult for Americans to accept. 
However, the properly planned and executed use of smart power has the potential to 
achieve longer lasting and more enduring effects than does the reactive use of hard power 
alone. The soft elements of smart power allow all of the elements of national power to be 
applied. In the case of East Africa, this should include:  
1. Invest more in local implementing partners. Locally supported partners have 
better on-the-ground awareness of key factors that permit youth to be manipulated. Also, 
locally run programs provide the opportunity for the U.S. government to help influence 
areas well outside of the capital city. Perhaps even more importantly, supporting local 
implementing partners means those partners will help embassy personnel stay informed, 
and will be well-positioned to help the host nation counter negative influence from 
external actors. 
2. Understand the environment and pick the right projects. The United States 
must be deliberate in where and how it intervenes abroad, and not everywhere or 
everything can be a priority. A dispersed method prevents U.S.-funded projects from 
growing too large and from creating dependency issues or inadvertently favoring one 
community over another. We have seen the problems that can arise from both kinds of 
situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, only choosing select projects allows the 
United States to maintain a small footprint in the host country, preserving the United 
States’ ability to engage in other regions as necessary.  
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3. Increase professionalization of partner-nation forces. Both Kenya and 
Tanzania have extremely capable military forces. However, given the quickly changing 
nature of 21st century terrorism, both countries could benefit from additional training and 
professionalization. Advanced counterinsurgency training, better intelligence-sharing 
agreements, and training in joint and combined operations would help military units in 
both countries stay proficient. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense should assist 
Kenya and Tanzania in the development of their own national counterterrorism forces.  
4. Increase U.S. Special Operations Forces presence in problem areas. The 
deployment of select Department of Defense personnel, specifically Special Operations 
Forces (SOF), to the region would help provide the U.S. government with increased 
awareness and would prove of assistance to partner forces. These U.S. SOF units should 
remain small to prevent over-militarizing the situation and should work closely with local 
partner forces. 
5. Get serious in Somalia. Somalia’s collapse and the resulting instability must be 
remedied if the region hopes to find some level of peace. The establishment of an official 
diplomatic mission to Somalia is a critical first step; however, much more needs to be 
done to rebuild such a broken country. One additional step would be for the U.S. to 
support the training and advising of a dedicated Somali security force that would replace 
AMISOM. AMISOM should not be relied upon as a permanent solution in Somalia, and 
the development of Somali security forces would not only enable, but impel the Somali 
government to take responsibility for its own security situation. Additionally, the U.S. 
government should work with others to aid Somalia in the establishment of key civil 
services. This should include standard education, economic, and government services; it 
should also include infrastructure rebuilding, job training, refugee reintegration, and 
advancements in information technologies. All of these essential services present the 
chance for Somalia, and Somalis, to reestablish ownership of the country. 
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C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
If present trends continue, we can expect to see continued influence from external 
actors and an ever-growing youth bulge. Both will continue to impact the stability of 
Kenya and Tanzania, as will conditions in Somalia. Somalia’s lack of a functioning 
government and general lawlessness have proved to be a breeding ground for extremism. 
This has been the case since the early 1990s, and unless the political and security 
situation can be changed, violence in Somalia and involving Somalis will continue to 
have a destabilizing effect throughout the region, but especially in Kenya and Tanzania. 
Beyond the effects of spillover violence from Somalia, traditionally tolerant 
African versions of Islam are also being deliberately targeted, undermined, and replaced 
by versions that are more radical. Many East Africans Muslims, especially younger 
Muslims, are seeking to identify their place within global Islam. For those anxious to 
reject clan or tribal and familial ties, the Umma can be very attractive. But surely there 
are better ways to capture youths’ attention apart from radicalization. One such option is 
to actively engage with youth and encourage moderate Islamic practices. Another option 
would be to work much harder to increase employment opportunities.  
The environment in East Africa is quickly changing and radical groups are 
transforming in order to stay relevant. This can be seen in the emergence of al-Shabaab 
offshoot organizations, such as al-Hijra in Kenya and Ansar Muslim Youth Center in 
Tanzania. However, these are just two of a number of extremist organizations. Over the 
past several decades, both Kenya and Tanzania have made great strides and, as President 
Obama intoned, steps must continue to be taken to seize the extraordinary potential of the 
African people. This, too, is why complacency must be fought and proactive measures 
taken with respect to militant Islam. Otherwise, East Africans will be forced to live with 
the negative effects brought on by a radical, irresponsible minority.  
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APPENDIX A. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIMS190 
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APPENDIX C. KENYA COUNTRY PROFILE192 
 
Ethnic groups: 
Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, 
other African 15%, non-African (Asian, European, and Arab) 1% 
 
Languages: 
English (official), Kiswahili (official), numerous indigenous languages 
 
Religions: 
Christian 82.5% (Protestant 47.4%, Catholic 23.3%, other 11.8%), Muslim 11.1%, 




Country comparison to the world: 31 
 
Age structure: 
0-14 years: 42.1% (male 9,494,983/female 9,435,795) 
15-24 years: 18.7% (male 4,197,382/female 4,202,399) 
25-54 years: 32.8% (male 7,458,665/female 7,302,534) 
55-64 years: 3.7% (male 751,296/female 910,523) 
65 years and over: 2.8% (male 548,431/female 708,048) (2014 est.) 
                                                 






total: 19.1 years 
male: 18.9 years 
female: 19.2 years (2014 est.) 
 
Population growth rate: 




APPENDIX D. TANZANIA COUNTRY PROFILE193 
 
Ethnic groups: 
mainland - African 99% (of which 95% are Bantu consisting of more than 130 tribes), 
other 1% (consisting of Asian, European, and Arab); Zanzibar - Arab, African, mixed 
Arab and African 
 
Languages: 
Kiswahili or Swahili (official), Kiunguja (name for Swahili in Zanzibar), English 
(official, primary language of commerce, administration, and higher education), Arabic 
(widely spoken in Zanzibar), many local languages 
 
Religions: 





Country comparison to the world: 26 
 
Age structure: 
0-14 years: 44.6% (male 11,173,655/female 10,962,186) 
15-24 years: 19.5% (male 4,838,216/female 4,841,338) 
25-54 years: 29.5% (male 7,340,129/female 7,289,483) 
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55-64 years: 3.5% (male 745,214/female 985,524) 




total: 17.4 years 
male: 17.1 years 
female: 17.7 years (2014 est.) 
 
Population growth rate: 









Ethnic groups:  
Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs) 
 
Languages:  








country comparison to the world: 85 
 
Age structure:  
0-14 years: 44% (male 2,293,746/female 2,298,442) 
15-24 years: 18.9% (male 995,102/female 970,630) 
25-54 years: 31.2% (male 1,681,705/female 1,571,586) 
55-64 years: 3.6% (male 180,622/female 199,059) 
                                                 




65 years and over: 2.3% (male 92,707/female 144,444) (2014 est.) 
 
Median age:  
total: 17.7 years 
male: 17.9 years 
female: 17.6 years (2014 est.) 
 
Population growth rate:  
1.75% (2014 est.) 
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